### 1nc Cohesion Shell

#### NATO is unified now but issues over dependence on the US risk alliance fracture

Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Alexander Vershbow et al 6/24/22

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While Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine has reinvigorated the Atlantic alliance, it has also deepened Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States. As North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies continue to help Ukraine beat back Russia’s assault, they must also address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing trans-Atlantic defense. Doing so means squaring a triangle of issues: ensuring Europe’s capacity to defend itself against Russia and manage a range of additional crises, many along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the north Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.[1]2¶ Advancing greater European strategic responsibility starts by defining the concept in a way designed to strengthen the Atlantic alliance. It should focus on two military goals. First, European allies should build their conventional military capabilities to a level that would provide half of the forces and capabilities, including the strategic enablers, required for deterrence and collective defense against major-power aggression. Second, European allies should develop capabilities to conduct crisis management operations in Europe’s neighborhood without today’s heavy reliance on U.S. enablers such as strategic lift, refueling, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

#### Shifting NATO strategy to increased focus on tech undermines cohesion- NATO members may agree broadly, but disagree over specific approaches

Lauren Speranza 21 ;Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis; https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future;

The concept is a guiding document, now under development, intended to revitalise NATO’s purpose and core tasks for the future. After former US President Donald Trump’s and French President Emmanuel Macron’s respective accusations of NATO being “obsolete” and “brain dead”, the alliance is in grave need of a new concept that brings the US and Europe together to tackle the security challenges of today and tomorrow. The problem, however, is that the two sides are not entirely coordinated on how to do that.¶ Compared to the Trump era, divisions among the allies are not nearly as evident. But given Washington’s growing focus on the Indo-Pacific over Europe and flawed coordination efforts thus far, its allies have some doubts about how America’s intentions regarding NATO will mesh with their own. Europe, for its part, is in some ways stronger than ever—thanks to four years of consolidating its own interests and capabilities in response to growing US unpredictability. Now, it finds itself sometimes at odds with Washington over key issues such as China, strategic autonomy and even technology. Simultaneously, it is more capable of defending its positions. Given the domestic political volatility in the US, its allies are skeptical about what US decisions will last through the next presidential elections. This means their own decisions matter even more. All of these dynamics complicate the crafting of NATO’s future common agenda.¶ Nevertheless, the Biden administration remains committed to NATO. President Joe Biden and his team believe America and its allies are at a historical inflection point. In the strategic competition with China and Russia, they view NATO as a great advantage. They see the strategic concept drafting process as a critical opportunity to make NATO work better in this environment—to serve not only US interests, but the shared interests of its allies and partners. For the US, adapting NATO for strategic competition will mean closing a decades-long chapter of out-of-area operations in favour of investing more in cyber and technological capabilities. It will require empowering Europe to be a more equal partner in defence, as well as creating more global partnership platforms to support allied objectives beyond the Euro-Atlantic sphere. It will also involve reinforcing the shared democratic values that unite NATO allies against their authoritarian challengers. To these ends, the US has a robust list of priorities for NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

#### Russia will exploit divisions between NATO members to instigate nuclear crises---extinction.

Kulesa ’18 [Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>]

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed?¶ Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions.¶ Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.¶ Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses.¶ Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.¶ The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.¶ With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.¶ Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.¶ Conflict termination¶ Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate.

### 1nc Deterrence Shell

#### NATO’s strategy is focused on conventional deterrence of Russia

David Hughes 6/29/22

PA Political Editor, in Madrid; Nato steps up plans to counter Russia’s ‘significant and direct threat’; PA Media: UK News; <https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/nato-steps-plans-counter-russia-155303853.html>

Nato has agreed a “fundamental shift” which will see it return to Cold War-style readiness to respond to the increased threat posed by Russia.¶ Prime Minister Boris Johnson said Vladimir Putin had been proved “completely wrong” about the strength of the defence alliance, which is set to expand to include Sweden and Finland after they ended decades of neutrality over concerns about Russia.¶ Leaders of the 30 Nato members gathered in Madrid to agree a new plan for the alliance in response to the invasion of Ukraine.¶ The move will mean 300,000 troops at high readiness next year, up from the current level of 40,000, although details of how that will be achieved and what the UK contribution will be have not yet been thrashed out.¶ Nato secretary general Jens Stoltenberg said: “Today, Nato leaders decided a fundamental shift in our defence and deterrence to respond to a new security reality.”¶ Heavy equipment will be pre-positioned in eastern Nato members along with stockpiles of supplies, while forces from western members will be assigned specific regions on the eastern flank to protect in partnership with local troops.¶ “This is the first time since the Cold War that we have these kind of plans with pre-assigned forces,” Mr Stoltenberg said.¶ The Nato leaders were addressed by Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky, who criticised them for failing to do enough to equip his forces or grant his country membership of the alliance.¶ Speaking via video link from Kyiv he said Ukraine’s resistance was protecting the Nato members.¶ He asked: “Hasn’t our contribution to defending Europe and the entire civilization been sufficient? What else is necessary?”¶ But Mr Stoltenberg said: “Ukraine can count on us for as long as it takes.¶ “Allies will continue to provide major military and financial help.”¶ The alliance agreed a new assistance package including communications kit, fuel, medical supplies and body armour, along with counter-mine equipment and anti-drone systems.¶ The new strategic concept adopted by Nato makes clear that Russia poses “the most significant and direct threat” to security.

#### Expanding NATO security strategy risks undermining the alliance’s core defense of conventional deterrence

Tardy ’20 (Thierry Tardy is Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College in Rome. Previously he held senior research and management positions at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. His fields of expertise include NATO’s policy and adaptation, the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), NATO-EU relations, the politics of crisis management, UN peace operations, and French security and defense policy, “The risks of NATO’s maladaptation,” European Security, 30:1, 24-42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1799786)-> HL

From crisis management back to collective defence International security institutions have often been faced with the difficulty of calibrating their own sphere of operation so that they respond to the concerns of their member states and meet the intent of their original mandate. This is what congruence is about. It draws on the comparative advantages of the organisation under consideration, analysed against the evolution of the security environment and member states’ policies. One aspect of this debate relates to how an institution and its member states define the scope of activities to be covered; how specialised versus how broad-ranging an institution’s mandate must be (See Koremenos et al. 2001, Guzman 2013). This, in turn, feeds into the adaptation process, as a particular balance of activities may need to be changed to respond to new needs. With the end of the Cold War NATO has been faced with this debate in different ways: with the embrace of crisis management in the early 1990s at a time when collective defence was no longer central (See Rupp 2000, Galen Carpenter 2001); with the counter-terrorism turn post-911; and more recently with the move back to collective defence in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Back in the early 1990s, NATO’s purpose was deeply challenged, most notably due to the fading away of its collective defence core task, and the mismatch that it implied between the Alliance’s character as a defence actor and the nature of the security needs. NATO needed to adapt. This debate, both in academic and policy circles, raised existential questions about NATO’s nature and purpose (see McCalla 1996, Wallander 2000, Menon and Welsh 2011). This was inter alia encapsulated by the “out of area or out of business” formula, by US Senator Richard Lugar (1993), which implied that crisis management operations con- ducted outside of the North Atlantic area were a response to the risk of irrelevance pro- voked by the absence of an existential threat. Crisis management was undoubtedly important; as a matter of fact, crisis management operations in the 1990s and 2000s were by far the most visible NATO activity (Frantzen 2005, Edström and Gyllensporre 2012). Yet these operations were also challenges to NATO’s core defence function. Among the key questions raised was that of the need for NATO to adapt to a constantly evolving security environment, yet raising the risk that embracing an increas- ingly broader security mandate would undermine NATO’s core defence character. The “winning the peace” agenda would not substitute or even complement the war-fighting core role without (negative) consequences for the latter (Yost 1998, Nelson 2006). In a post-911 context, the role of NATO in counter-terrorism (CT) raised similar ques- tions. NATO had to adapt to the new environment, and thus respond to the terrorist threat (for which its Article 5 had been invoked for the first time), yet the comparative advantage of the Alliance in CT was not obvious to everyone, both for political and oper- ational reasons (Valasek 2001/2002). These two examples of crisis management and counter-terrorism show how an adap- tation process can generate side-effects that in the end may increase the vulnerability of the institution, through maladaptation. In this context, 2014 has been a key moment in NATO’s congruence quest (Webber et al. 2014). The 2014 Ukraine crisis and with it the annexation of Crimea by Russia have signifi- cantly changed the European security landscape and, for European security actors, their own perception of threats. While Russia was beforehand seen as a partner by most Euro- pean states (NATO 2012, para. 36),1 the Ukraine crisis brought it back to the category of threats. The New Cold War had begun (Lucas 2008, Trenin 2014, Kroenig 2015). For NATO, this meant a return to the so-called deterrence and defence agenda,2 and to the core task of collective defence, as defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept (NATO 2010). A few months after the annexation of Crimea, NATO member states meet at the Wales Summit, and state that “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace” (NATO 2014, para. 1), and that “the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (NATO 2014, para. 2). Since then most of NATO’s attention has been towards the menace of a resurgent Russia, be it in terms of narrative (or securitisation process) and policy-making, capability development, military posture or exercises (see Ringsmose and Rynning 2017), leading NATO’s Secretary General to talk about “the largest reinforcement of our collective defence” since the end of the Cold War (NATO Secretary General 2018). Decisions taken include (Turner 2019): the strengthening of NATO’s rapid reaction forces, with the trebling of the size of the NATO Response Force, and the creation of a “spearhead force” within it, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); the deployment of multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, known as the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP); the increasing of the exercise programme, with a new stress on collective defence exercises; the adoption of the NATO Readiness Initiative that aims at increasing the readiness of NATO forces with an additional 30 manoeuvre battalions, 30 major naval combatants and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days’ readiness; and the building of resilience, including defence against cyber-attacks and other forms of “hybrid” attacks.

#### Prioritizing deterrence is key to prevent Russian aggression

Kochis et. al, ‘22 (Daniel Kochis, senior policy analyst in European affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Thomas W. Spoehr, Director for the Center for National Defense, Patty-Jane Geller, Senior Policy Analyst on Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense at the Center for National Defense, Luke Coffey, Former Director for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, “The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time”, The Heritage Foundation, March 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-russian-threat-bolstering-nato-deterrence-critical-time)-amc

The security and prosperity of the transatlantic community, including the United States, rests on the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s ongoing war of naked aggression against Ukraine, a NATO non-member state, should put to rest any lingering questions about the modern utility of the Alliance and about which threat should be the focus of NATO’s upcoming strategic concept. The answer is clear: The U.S. must lead the Alliance to a wholesale refocusing on the organization’s raison d’être of collective defense. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to the increased threat from Russia. Deterrence measures should include an Alliance-wide recommitment to defense spending; a persistent and continuing U.S. presence in Eastern European member states; updated Alliance operational planning in light of Russia’s position in Belarus and Ukraine; and an increase in U.S. air, ground, and naval forces in the European theater as a sign of continued commitment to the NATO treaty’s Article 5. These deterrence measures must be carried out with the recognition that, from a long-term perspective, China is the largest peer challenger from whom the U.S. must expect hostile action. Any improvements to the U.S. force posture must not be to the detriment of the nation’s ability to counter China. From the Arctic to the Levant, Russia remains an aggressive and capable threat to NATO and the interests of its members. For member states in Eastern Europe, Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat. Russia’s entrenched position in Belarus, along with its ongoing actions to cleave Ukraine, a nation that borders four NATO members, in two, scramble the geostrategic map of Europe and necessitate changes to NATO operational planning, exemplifying the need for the Alliance to take swift and resolute steps to bolster deterrence measures along its eastern flank.

## Uniqueness

### Limited Deterrence Focus Now

#### Deterring Russia is still at the heart of NATO’s strategy

NVU 6/29/22

New Voice of Ukraine; NATO leaders call Russia ‘most significant and direct threat’ to allies' security; The New Voice of Ukraine; https://news.yahoo.com/nato-leaders-call-russia-most-164800744.html

The document lists NATO's priorities, key objectives and approaches for the next decade, as well as describing NATO's security situation, values and key objectives for ensuring the collective defense of the allies.¶ The alliance also addressed the issue of China for the first time, and the challenges that Beijing poses toward the allies' security, interests and values.¶ The new Strategic Concept also states that climate change is "a defining challenge of our time."¶ "We will continue to develop our partnerships with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine to advance our common interest in Euro-Atlantic peace, stability and security," the document says.¶ "We reaffirm the decision we took at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and all subsequent decisions with respect to Georgia and Ukraine."¶ It is also noted that "the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace, and gravely altered our security environment. Its brutal and unlawful invasion, repeated violations of international humanitarian law and heinous attacks and atrocities have caused unspeakable suffering and destruction."¶ "A strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area," NATO said.¶ The new Strategic Concept emphasizes that Russia "seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order."¶ At the same time, NATO stressed that it does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation.¶ "In light of its hostile policies and actions, we cannot consider the Russian Federation to be our partner," it said.

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#### NATO’s strategy centers the conventional deterrence of Russian aggression

DAVID M. HERSZENHORN June 29, 2022

NATO leaders brand Russia a ‘direct threat’ in new strategy blueprint; Politico; https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-leader-adopt-strategy-blueprint-branding-russia-direct-threat/

NATO leaders meeting in Madrid adopted a new strategic blueprint on Wednesday bluntly branding Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”¶ The unvarnished labeling of Russia as a clear and present danger in NATO’s new “Strategic Concept” — a once-in-a-decade planning document — represents the leaders’ formal verdict on President Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, which brought full-scale war to Europe for the first time in the 21st century.¶ At a news conference announcing NATO leaders’ initial decisions at their meeting in Madrid, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg hailed the landmark decision by Finland and Sweden to abandon decades of non-alignment and join NATO.¶ Stoltenberg triumphantly welcomed the two Nordic countries, which got a green light on Tuesday night to join the alliance after weeks of obstruction by Turkey. Stoltenberg said the expected expansion showed Putin’s war had backfired and that the Russian dictator had failed in his goal of preventing the alliance from adding new members.¶ “The decision to invite Finland and Sweden to become members demonstrates that NATO’s door is open,” Stoltenberg said. “It demonstrates that President Putin did not succeed in closing NATO’s door. NATO’s door remains open. And it also demonstrates that we respect the sovereign right of every nation to choose their path.”¶ Of course, Putin’s main objection was to prevent Ukraine from joining the alliance. And, for now at least, he has succeeded in dashing any lingering aspirations in Kyiv to join the alliance.¶ NATO powers, led by the U.S., have made clear that they do not want to be drawn into a direct conflict in Russia, at least partly because of fear that Putin would use a nuclear weapon. And while allies have insisted that, theoretically, Ukraine has every right to pursue NATO membership, there is no chance the war-ravaged country will be able to join any time soon, if ever. That’s because NATO’s collective defense clause, known as Article 5, would immediately require the allies to join the fight against Russia.¶ Stoltenberg, at his news conference, said that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had joined the leaders’ summit discussions by video link and that NATO had committed to continue supporting Ukraine in the war.¶ “President Zelenskyy made clear that Ukraine relies on our continued support,” Stoltenberg said. “And our message to him was equally clear. Ukraine can count on us — for as long as it takes.”¶ That language echoed a summit declaration issued on Tuesday by the G7 industrialized democracies at their own leaders’ summit in Elmau, Germany. (All of the G7 countries, except Japan, are NATO members.)¶ Stoltenberg said NATO would take new steps to help modernize Ukraine’s military, but it was far from clear that the assistance would be sufficient or arrive quickly enough to tilt the war in Kyiv’s favor.¶ “Allies will continue to provide major military and financial help,” Stoltenberg said. “And today, leaders agreed to strengthen our support by agreeing a ‘Comprehensive Assistance Package’ for Ukraine. This includes secure communications, fuel, medical supplies and body armor. Equipment to counter mines and chemical and biological threats, and hundreds of portable anti-drone systems.”¶ In the previous Strategic Concept, adopted in 2010, the allies called Russia a “strategic partner,” and they did not reference China at all. In the new edition, they described China as a challenge to allies’ “interests, security and values.”¶ And they did not mince words about the peril they see in Putin’s military aggression.¶ Russia, they wrote, “seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation.”¶ The document cites Moscow’s use of both traditional and digital aggression, warns about the country’s “modernizing” nuclear forces and chastises it for its nuclear threats — all done with disregard for the “rules-based international order”¶ “It aims to destabilize countries to our East and South,” it adds. “In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance.”¶ At the same time, the allies claimed they did not want to be in such a hostile relationship.¶ “NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation,” the leaders wrote. “We will continue to respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way.” ¶ In the blueprint, the allies declared their intention to develop an even more robust defensive presence on the alliance’s Eastern Flank but claimed they remained open to any shift from Moscow.

### Limited Strategy Now

#### NATO using a limited strategic approach- current discussions are centered around Russia and conventional deterrence.

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NATO’s Strategic Concept is meant to provide a diagnosis of a dynamic international security environment, identify the main threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, and outline ways to address such challenges. It is meant, therefore, to inform NATO policies for years to come. Throughout the Cold War, NATO Strategic Concepts – which remained classified – lasted roughly a decade on average. When adopted, the Madrid strategic Concept will be NATO’s fourth since the end of the Cold War. Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasise societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. Even though the Strategic Concept is meant to inform long-term strategy, the salience of the war in Ukraine and the fact that it is likely to reverberate for years to come, makes the crisis important when developing the Concept.

### NATO Unity Now- Russia Focus

#### NATO maintaining a unified front to deter Russia now

Picheta 6/29/22 (Rob Picheta; digital news producer at CNN; 6/29/22; “Sweden and Finland are on the cusp of joining NATO. Here's why that matters, and what comes next”; CNN; https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/europe/nato-sweden-finland-summit-explainer-intl/index.html)//akg

(CNN) Sweden and Finland are set formally to end decades of neutrality and join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in a historic breakthrough for the alliance that deals a blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The last major hurdle to the two nations' entry to the bloc was removed when Turkey dropped its opposition on Tuesday. That breakthrough came during a NATO summit in Madrid that has already become one of the most consequential meetings in the history of the military alliance. The two countries are now expected to become full NATO members quickly, shoring up the bloc's eastern flank within months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Here's all you need to know about why the move happened, what comes next and why it matters. What are the latest developments? Sweden and Finland both announced their intention to join NATO in May, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine caused a sudden shift in attitudes toward joining the bloc. That announcement was welcomed by almost all of NATO's leaders -- but there was one significant obstacle. Turkey's President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said he was not looking at both countries joining NATO "positively," accusing them of housing Kurdish "terrorist organizations." Under NATO rules, just one member state can veto a new applicant's membership. However, a big diplomatic breakthrough between the three countries took place at the NATO summit in Madrid on Tuesday. Turkey signed a trilateral memorandum with Finland and Sweden, lifting its opposition and officially welcoming them to join the bloc. "In NATO, we have always shown that whatever our differences, we can always sit down, find common ground and resolve any issues. NATO's open door policy has been an historic success," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told journalists in Madrid. On Wednesday, NATO formally invited Sweden and Finland to join, kickstarting a multistage process that will end with both countries holding full membership. Ukraine&#39;s President Volodymyr Zelensky on Wednesday addressed the Madrid NATO summit, where a key diplomatic breakthrough has paved the way for Sweden and Finland to join. What happens next? Stoltenberg said Wednesday that he expects Sweden and Finland to become members of the military alliance quickly. The invitation sparks a seven-step accession process. Key moments along that path include talks between NATO and the candidate countries. The candidates must formally accept the obligations of membership, and then current member states sign an Accession Protocol, before individually ratifying it back home. "We need a ratification process in 30 parliaments -- that always takes some time but I expect also that to go rather quickly because allies are ready to try to make that ratification process happen as quickly as possible," Stoltenberg explained Wednesday. After that, the candidate country is formally invited to accede to the Washington Treaty, the founding document of the alliance. NATO has an "open door" policy -- any country can be invited to join if it expresses an interest, as long as it is able and willing to uphold the principles of the bloc's founding treaty. The ratification process usually takes about a year, from the signing of the Accession Protocol by existing members to the country joining the Washington Treaty. But the war in Ukraine has added unprecedented urgency to Sweden and Finland's membership, and the timeline could be accelerated accordingly. How have leaders reacted? US President Joe Biden praised the breakthrough with Turkey, saying it sent a clear signal to Russia that NATO was united and growing. Sweden and Finland's "decision to move away from neutrality and the tradition of neutrality to join the NATO alliance is going to make us stronger and more secure and NATO stronger," Biden said. "We are sending an unmistakable message in my view... that NATO is strong, united, and the steps we are taking during this summit are going to further augment our collective strength." Inside Biden's successful six-month bid to expand NATO Biden said the two Nordic countries' accession was a sign Putin's aims had backfired. "Putin was looking for the Finlandization of Europe," he said, referring to the so-called Finlandization dynamic that saw Russia dominant over the foreign policy of its smaller neighbor for decades. "He's going to get the NATOization of Europe, and that is exactly what he did not want, that's exactly what needs to be done to guarantee security for Europe. And I think it's necessary," Biden said. The move was met with delight across the countries that make up NATO's eastern front, many of which have expressed concern that they could be next in Russia's crosshairs if it is successful in Ukraine. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said the step was "significant," and Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda called it "wonderful news."

#### A unified military response to Ukraine proves cohesion and sets the groundwork for a NATO pivot in Europe.

Garamone 5/19 (Jim Garamone Reporter at U.S. Department of Defense) “NATO Military Leaders Address Security in Wake of Russian Invasion of Ukraine” MAY 19, 2022 <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3038165/nato-military-leaders-address-security-in-wake-of-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/> // ZX

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February, the North Atlantic Alliance has proven its capabilities to mobilize for collective defense and ably support the Ukrainians fighting for their country, the top [NATO](https://www.nato.int/) military leaders said today. Dutch Adm. Rob Bauer, the chairman of the alliance's military committee, emphasized the alliance faces a new situation. "The focus of this meeting was on collective defense," he said following a meeting of NATO military leaders. "Without a doubt, a new era for NATO has begun. In the past few months, NATO has shown that it is capable [of swiftly and effectively changing] its posture. We have implemented the largest reinforcement of collective defense in a generation." The 30-nation Atlantic alliance capitalized on work begun after Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014 to speedily reinforce vulnerable frontline states. All this is part of the new NATO military strategy, which — Bauer said — is evolving even as Russia poured over Ukraine's border on February 24. Russian President Vladimir Putin's war in Ukraine "has presented us with a new strategic reality," Bauer said. A reality the NATO nations can face down. At the meeting, Bauer said the allied chiefs of defense heard from their Ukrainian counterpart. "We commended Ukraine for the willingness across all generations to fight for freedom," Bauer said. "Ukraine will never accept Russian occupation, and NATO will support Ukraine for as long as necessary." The chiefs also discussed what Putin's war means to the alliance both in the short term and long. "I want to stress that we are not looking at the situation in Ukraine alone," Bauer said. "Together with Finland and Sweden, and our Asia-Pacific partners — Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of South Korea — the chiefs of defense discussed how we can best assess all global defensive alliances. It is very much our adversary who determines the timeline. And that means we always have to be ready to expect the unexpected." Ukraine has fought the Russian military to a standstill, and in fact, driven it away from the capital of Kyiv. The Ukrainians are pushing back the Russians in the Donbas region. Bauer ascribes the success — in part — to the difference in morale of the force. "There are many lessons to be learned from the war in Ukraine," he said. "Most importantly, it has once again proven the importance of morale, to know what you are fighting for. The 3.2 million men and women in uniform who serve this alliance know exactly what they are fighting for: The protection of freedom and democracy; the protection of our way of life." Air Force Gen. Tod D. Wolters, commander of European Command and the NATO supreme allied commander Europe, also discussed Ukraine at the news conference. He noted that the allies have supplied the Ukrainian military with weapon systems that have been effective against the overwhelming size of the Russian force. "All of this is making a difference, helping Ukraine defend its people, its territory and it's free and democratic future," he said. The United States helps lead these efforts "with speed and agility." He noted that the United States has provided more than $4 billion in lethal assistance since the invasion. "For the last 84 days, our focus is to support so that Ukraine can prevail," Wolters said. "With respect to the defense of the alliance, we've responded in all domains, in all regions, to shield all allies. We've deployed elements of the NATO Response Force to strengthen our forward defense." There are now eight battle groups under NATO command deployed along the eastern flank. There are now over 42,000 troops and 120 jets on high alert, with more than 20 ships ready to respond, he said. "Our land domain has seen a 10-fold increase, the air domain a 50 percent increase of fighters patrolling the skies." The United States now has more than 100,000 service members in Europe to ensure deterrence works, and the alliance has re-started training Ukrainian service members. "The bottom line: NATO resolve and unity is as great as it's ever been," Wolters said. "The performance of our Ukrainian partners facing this aggression has been very, very impressive." While NATO has changed to confront Russia, the alliance must continue the transformation of the armed forces and military capabilities to meet the new strategic realities, said French Air and Space Gen. Philippe Lavigne, the supreme allied commander transformation. "Transformation is not only technology, it is innovation, it is a mindset change, it is people and their new skills," he said. "The Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the consequences that war produced for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area is an additional trigger to accelerate the path of transformation." Lavigne said the military leaders are convinced the alliance must continue to build capacity to engage and be able to operate in multi-domain operations: Land, sea, air, space and cyber. "This is both a strategic challenge and an opportunity," he said. "It is a challenge, because we have to develop the ability to deal and synchronize with multiple actors, military, governmental, civilian and industry. And it's also an opportunity because we will be stronger together."

### UQ/Link- European Autonomy

#### NATO unification is high now because of Ukraine, but debates over European autonomy risk fracture

McRaven et.al 4-20 (WILLIAM  H. MCRAVEN, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014, PETER ORSZAG is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008, THEODORE BUNZEL, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department, “Made in the Alliance: How to Shore up the Foundations of Transatlantic Solidarity” Foreign Affairs, April 20 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance)-amc>

“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies,” British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once said, “and that is fighting without them.” Even when their value is clear, alliances are hard to establish and even harder to maintain. The glue of any coalition is trust among its members, and trust can’t be surged in a crisis—it must be built up over time. For over 70 years, NATO’s members have built up trust; in spite of much political bickering and animosity, Washington’s NATO allies have trusted the United States and respected its leadership. Yet in the years before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this hard-won trust had begun to erode. At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. military presence in Europe was around a half million troops. Today, the Ukraine crisis has temporarily pushed the U.S. military presence in Europe to 100,000 troops, but fewer than 40,000 soldiers are permanently stationed on the continent. Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO and his administration’s effort to close military bases and reduce the U.S. presence in Europe were never fully executed, but the message it sent to U.S. allies was damning. More recently, the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan left NATO allies in the lurch, struggling to justify their involvement with the United States over the past 20 years after being caught off guard by the speed and timing of the pullout. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has [steeled](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2022-04-06/cold-war-never-ended-russia-ukraine-war) the Western military alliance and reinforced the importance of NATO. But despite the unity now on display, those ties could fray in the months and years ahead. Germany’s pledge to dramatically increase defense expenditure marks a fundamental turning point in European security, setting Berlin on the path toward becoming the world’s third-largest military spender, behind the United States and China. The EU, meanwhile, has taken tentative steps toward greater defense cooperation, with the creation of a rapid reaction force as part of its Strategic Compass concept. And Macron has used the Ukraine crisis to reiterate calls for “strategic autonomy,” declaring, “We cannot depend on others to defend us.”

### UQ/Link- Expanded Strategy

#### NATO is unified now, but new security priorities can lead to fracturing

McRaven et.al 4-20 (WILLIAM  H. MCRAVEN, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014, PETER ORSZAG is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008, THEODORE BUNZEL, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department, “Made in the Alliance: How to Shore up the Foundations of Transatlantic Solidarity” Foreign Affairs, April 20 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance)-amc>

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the Western alliance and bolstered transatlantic solidarity. After being declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, NATO has sprung to life, deploying forces to its eastern flank and coordinating the provision of sophisticated weapons that have helped Ukraine impede Russia’s invasion. For the first time in its history, the European Union has financed the purchase and delivery of lethal aid. Western countries have vastly exceeded expectations in implementing coordinated financial sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy. Even neutral Switzerland joined the fray. But no matter how remarkable this solidarity may be in the short term, there is no guarantee that it will last: if policymakers are complacent, powerful trends predating the Ukraine crisis could overwhelm and ultimately derail it. Protectionist sentiment and self-defeating trade wars have pulled at the seams of Western economic integration. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 have chipped away at military trust between the United States and Europe. A Marine Le Pen victory later this month in France would pose additional challenges to the alliance, and looming concerns about the 2024 presidential election raise doubts about the United States’ commitment. If not managed intelligently, the reawakening of Europe as a diplomatic and military actor and the reexamination of global economic interdependence catalyzed by Russia’s invasion could result not in a strengthened transatlantic alliance but in a more worrying outcome: the emergence of three distinct blocs, one centered around the United States, a second around Europe, and a third around China (which would include Russia). Such a world—with the United States and Europe often collaborating, but also at odds when their interests diverge—would make the management of China and Russia more difficult, as the two would have opportunities to trigger and exploit U.S.-European tensions. It would also represent a major missed opportunity for the United States and Europe.

### At: EDT Focus Now

#### Status quo NATO efforts to integrate EDT are just rhetorical theater- substantive changes to NATO risk divisions over approach

Lauren Speranza and Nicholas Nelson in 2020

Lauren Speranza (@LaurenSperanza) is Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Nicholas Nelson is a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at CEPA; NATO needs a strategy for emerging and disruptive technologies; Defense News; https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2020/12/08/nato-needs-a-strategy-for-emerging-and-disruptive-technologies/

The incoming Biden administration is expected to reassert ties with Europe, hoping to leverage America’s allies and partners at NATO in the great power competition with China and Russia. As U.S. and European leaders set their collective agenda at the next NATO summit, a top priority should be establishing a NATO framework for emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT).¶ For the United States, it is important that the alliance adapt together to defend against algorithms and bots, as much as bullets and bombs. Europe shares this mindset but differs from the United States on key defense tech issues, such as regulation, data, and stakes in national champion companies. To avoid the dangerous transatlantic rifts of the last four years, Brussels and Washington must bridge that gap and forge an alliance approach to EDT.¶ NATO has acknowledged the need to harness the power of such technologies, but current efforts have produced innovation theater, as opposed to fundamental organizational change. NATO lags behind in critical areas such as 5G, hypersonics, artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned systems, and quantum science.

### At: EDT Now- Aff Uq Links

#### Status quo commitments to increased focus on EDT is all rhetoric- the Aff’s substantive focus on China and insistence that the US determine the direction on NATO innovation lead to alliance divisions over burden-sharing and European autonomy

Rachel Ellehuus in 2021

Secretary of Defense Representative in Europe (SECDEFREPEUR) and the Defense Advisor (DEFAD) for the U.S. Mission to NATO; NATO Futures: Three Trajectories; CSIS; https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-futures-three-trajectories

One secret to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) longevity has been its ability to continually adapt to the ever-changing external security environment and needs of its members. This is all the more needed today in a world that is at once more complex and more interconnected. Over the next decade, NATO’s ability to adapt and remain relevant for the future will depend on both external and internal drivers of cohesion and division. External drivers include the threats and opportunities facing the alliance and its individual members, the availability of other competent security and defense partners, and the degree of countervailing influence by competitors. Internal drivers for NATO include shared identity and values, political cohesion around shared interests, the presence or absence of U.S. leadership, the degree of responsibility sharing in NATO; and the orientation and cohesiveness of national governments. Taken together, these factors create centrifugal and centripetal forces that can alternately drive NATO member countries together or pull them apart.¶ Trajectory 1 (Baseline): Muddling Through¶ OVERVIEW¶ NATO endures and remains relevant in many areas, but it fails to make the investments and reforms needed to make it fit for purpose in the future. Most crucially, allies agree to enhance NATO’s collective defense capabilities to include integrating multidomain tools into its deterrence and defense posture. Crisis management and cooperative security remain its core tasks, but it fails to secure the political support and resources needed to execute them effectively, and they increasingly take place through coalitions of the willing or under EU and UN auspices. Allies increase political coordination at NATO on issues ranging from China to emerging and disruptive technologies, but this results in little more than a “talk shop” that produces statements lamenting the state of the world and condemning adversaries’ actions. The United States and European allies become increasingly frustrated with one another—the United States with allies’ failure to assume more responsibility in and around Europe or to contribute more decisively to managing China, and allies with the United States’ seemingly myopic focus on China and unwillingness (despite statements to the contrary) to allow Europeans autonomy in their own affairs. Efforts to increase investment in innovation falter as allies pursue projects that benefit their own defense industrial bases but do not necessarily enhance NATO’s defense and security. Still others fail to invest in innovation at all, widening the technology gap among allies and harming interoperability.

### At: N/U over China

#### NATO members are at odds over the alliance posture toward China, but are remaining unified by leaving open the possibility of US-China cooperation

Andrea Shalal and Humeyra Pamuk 6/27/22

'Systemic challenge' or worse? NATO members wrangle over how to treat China; Reuters; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/systemic-challenge-or-worse-nato-members-wrangle-over-how-treat-china-2022-06-27/

NATO’s first new strategy concept in a decade will cite China as a concern for the first time but member states remain at odds over how to describe the country with the world's largest military and its relationship with Russia, NATO diplomats say.¶ Both a summit of the G7 rich industrial democracies now underway in Germany and a NATO summit to follow will tackle China's deepening ties with Russia after Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, and what is seen as the growing inclination of China to flex its geopolitical muscle and coercive economic might abroad.¶ The new strategic concept to be endorsed at the NATO summit in Madrid on Wednesday and Thursday will address increasing threats posed by Russia and, for the first time, China, the world's second largest economy, U.S. officials said last week.¶ A White House official voiced confidence on Sunday that the document would include "strong" language on China, but said the negotiations were continuing ahead of the NATO summit in Madrid on June 29-30. ¶ NATO diplomats said the United States and Britain have pushed for more forceful language to reflect what they see as China's increasing military ambitions and growing concern that it could attack the democratically governed island of Taiwan, which Beijing regards as its own territory.¶ France and Germany - given major European industrial investment in China - meanwhile favour more measured references, said the NATO diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity since the document was still being finalized.¶ At the Group of Seven summit on Monday, U.S. National Security adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters that NATO's strategy paper would "speak in ways that are unprecedented about the challenge that China poses".¶ One diplomat said a compromise was taking shape under which China would be described as a "systemic challenge", while including balancing language referring to a "willingness to work on areas of common interest" with Beijing.

## Link

### AI Policy

#### **New AI strategies lead to divisiveness in NATO- too much disagreement on appropriate guidelines**

Sharma 22 [Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.“NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis”. 6-29-2022. Eurasia Review - Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses. https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis. Accessed 6-28-2022; MJen]

NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems. Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29

#### AI strategy and fosters division in NATO- European and US interests diverge over level of regulation and funding

HeikkilÄ 22 [Melissa HeikkilÄ is a senior reporter for AI at MIT Technology Review. “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.”. 6-29-2022. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/. Accessed 6-28-2022; MJen]

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”

#### AI governance and cooperation leads to political hurdles as member states have different priorities

Zoe Stanley-Lockman¶ and Lena Trabucco in 2022

Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University and Political Science, University of Copenhagen; NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs; The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance; Edited by Justin Bullock, Yu-Che Chen, Johannes Himmelreich, Valerie M. Hudson, Anton Korinek, Matthew Young , and Baobao; Zhanghttps://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69

More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research.¶ On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.

### Cyber Policy

#### Ambiguities in cyberspace lead to drawn-out NATO decisions which result in disunity and fracture the alliance.

**Lonergan and Moller 22** [Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year. “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea”. 4-27-2022. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829. Accessed 6-28-2022; MJen]

President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable. One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO. After Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that NATO policy on collective defense and cyberspace holds strong, noting that NATO has “decided to make clear that a cyberattack can trigger Article 5.” And following an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and government on March 24, the alliance reinforced that it is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace.” But despite this rhetoric, exactly how and when Article 5 applies to cyberspace remains unclear. This ambiguity is a problem — with potentially disastrous consequences. Staking the credibility of Article 5 to what are often murky activities in cyberspace threatens to undermine the broader principle of collective defense. We can’t risk fracturing the transatlantic alliance at a critical juncture in its history over a debate on what constitutes a major or minor cyberattack. For that reason, NATO should move quickly to clarify its policy on cyberattacks and explicitly state the threshold for what would trigger an Article 5 response. Furthermore, NATO members should commit to treating cyberattacks that do not rise to the level of a major attack as a national matter — not one for the alliance. Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.” This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time. This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage. These challenges have major strategic implications for NATO. After years of publicly and repeatedly linking Article 5 to cyberspace and reinforcing that policy in response to the Ukraine conflict, a failure to achieve consensus and respond to a Russian cyberattack against a NATO member could imperil Article 5 in other areas. The disunity that is likely to be revealed during NAC deliberations would then undermine the broader political cohesion that has, for the most part, been remarkably strong throughout the war in Ukraine. This would make it more difficult for the alliance to respond to other forms of Russian behavior. As Biden emphasized at a press conference last month, “the single-most important thing is for us to stay unified … We have to stay fully, totally, thoroughly unified.” NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power.

#### Even cooperation agreements on cybersecurity can cause division- countries will disagree on how to interpret the plan

Max Smeets in 2019

Senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative; NATO Allies Need to Come to Terms With Offensive Cyber Operations; Lawfare; https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations

In May 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense and the German Ministry of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding concerning “Cooperation on Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense.” Computer network defense (CND) refers to actions taken on computer networks to monitor and protect those networks. It is not the only memorandum the U.S. Department of Defense has signed with allies on cyber defense.¶ In late 2016, U.S. Cyber Command operators wiped Islamic State propaganda material off a server located in Germany. The German government was notified in some fashion but not asked for advance consent, causing much frustration. While U.S. Cyber Command’s reported action may have violated Germany’s sovereignty, it didn’t explicitly violate the memorandum. It wasn’t an act of CND; it was a computer network attack (CNA), seeking to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy.¶ This reveals an uneasy situation within cyber cooperation: Allies do not agree on the appropriate procedures and boundaries for offensive cyber operations. More specifically, there is no agreement on when military cyber organizations can gain access to systems and networks in allied territory to disrupt adversarial activity. As I have argued previously, this issue may end up causing significant loss in allies’ trust and confidence. My proposed solution: NATO allies should establish memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory.

### Expanding Strategy

#### Expanding NATO security strategy risks undermining the alliance’s core defense of conventional deterrence

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From crisis management back to collective defence International security institutions have often been faced with the difficulty of calibrating their own sphere of operation so that they respond to the concerns of their member states and meet the intent of their original mandate. This is what congruence is about. It draws on the comparative advantages of the organisation under consideration, analysed against the evolution of the security environment and member states’ policies. One aspect of this debate relates to how an institution and its member states define the scope of activities to be covered; how specialised versus how broad-ranging an institution’s mandate must be (See Koremenos et al. 2001, Guzman 2013). This, in turn, feeds into the adaptation process, as a particular balance of activities may need to be changed to respond to new needs. With the end of the Cold War NATO has been faced with this debate in different ways: with the embrace of crisis management in the early 1990s at a time when collective defence was no longer central (See Rupp 2000, Galen Carpenter 2001); with the counter-terrorism turn post-911; and more recently with the move back to collective defence in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Back in the early 1990s, NATO’s purpose was deeply challenged, most notably due to the fading away of its collective defence core task, and the mismatch that it implied between the Alliance’s character as a defence actor and the nature of the security needs. NATO needed to adapt. This debate, both in academic and policy circles, raised existential questions about NATO’s nature and purpose (see McCalla 1996, Wallander 2000, Menon and Welsh 2011). This was inter alia encapsulated by the “out of area or out of business” formula, by US Senator Richard Lugar (1993), which implied that crisis management operations con- ducted outside of the North Atlantic area were a response to the risk of irrelevance pro- voked by the absence of an existential threat. Crisis management was undoubtedly important; as a matter of fact, crisis management operations in the 1990s and 2000s were by far the most visible NATO activity (Frantzen 2005, Edström and Gyllensporre 2012). Yet these operations were also challenges to NATO’s core defence function. Among the key questions raised was that of the need for NATO to adapt to a constantly evolving security environment, yet raising the risk that embracing an increas- ingly broader security mandate would undermine NATO’s core defence character. The “winning the peace” agenda would not substitute or even complement the war-fighting core role without (negative) consequences for the latter (Yost 1998, Nelson 2006). In a post-911 context, the role of NATO in counter-terrorism (CT) raised similar ques- tions. NATO had to adapt to the new environment, and thus respond to the terrorist threat (for which its Article 5 had been invoked for the first time), yet the comparative advantage of the Alliance in CT was not obvious to everyone, both for political and oper- ational reasons (Valasek 2001/2002). These two examples of crisis management and counter-terrorism show how an adap- tation process can generate side-effects that in the end may increase the vulnerability of the institution, through maladaptation. In this context, 2014 has been a key moment in NATO’s congruence quest (Webber et al. 2014). The 2014 Ukraine crisis and with it the annexation of Crimea by Russia have signifi- cantly changed the European security landscape and, for European security actors, their own perception of threats. While Russia was beforehand seen as a partner by most Euro- pean states (NATO 2012, para. 36),1 the Ukraine crisis brought it back to the category of threats. The New Cold War had begun (Lucas 2008, Trenin 2014, Kroenig 2015). For NATO, this meant a return to the so-called deterrence and defence agenda,2 and to the core task of collective defence, as defined in the 2010 Strategic Concept (NATO 2010). A few months after the annexation of Crimea, NATO member states meet at the Wales Summit, and state that “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace” (NATO 2014, para. 1), and that “the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (NATO 2014, para. 2). Since then most of NATO’s attention has been towards the menace of a resurgent Russia, be it in terms of narrative (or securitisation process) and policy-making, capability development, military posture or exercises (see Ringsmose and Rynning 2017), leading NATO’s Secretary General to talk about “the largest reinforcement of our collective defence” since the end of the Cold War (NATO Secretary General 2018). Decisions taken include (Turner 2019): the strengthening of NATO’s rapid reaction forces, with the trebling of the size of the NATO Response Force, and the creation of a “spearhead force” within it, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); the deployment of multinational battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, known as the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP); the increasing of the exercise programme, with a new stress on collective defence exercises; the adoption of the NATO Readiness Initiative that aims at increasing the readiness of NATO forces with an additional 30 manoeuvre battalions, 30 major naval combatants and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days’ readiness; and the building of resilience, including defence against cyber-attacks and other forms of “hybrid” attacks.

#### Broadening NATO’s strategic mission trades off with resources need for contemporary warfighting—the plan leads to infighting and undermines deterrence.

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Enlarging the scope: towards security and internal threats Acquiring a mandate or a capacity to tackle a broad range of threats implies that NATO moves in two directions: towards more security-type activities as opposed to defence- focused ones; and towards more internal issues. In both directions, a more assertive role for NATO implies three levels of activity: policy development, i.e. the ability to produce policy documents that frame NATO’s role in a particular domain; capability devel- opment, i.e. the ability to acquire expertise or resources that can be used for the implementation of a particular policy; and operations, i.e. the ability to act through oper- ational activities, be they exercises, training or actual use of NATO and member states’ capabilities placed under NATO command. These three levels allow us to distinguish between domains where NATO would only act in a coordination or information-sharing role (for which capability development and operations are not necessary), and domains where NATO would be having a more central function. Applied to the current landscape, the broadening security agenda beyond what is already done would imply a more assertive role for NATO in defensive/offensive cyber activities (with the cyberspace being an operational domain and covered by Article 5), in the fight against organised crime networks, inter alia through maritime security, as well as in the broad security sector reform (SSR) agenda of partner countries, to take just a few examples. In all these tasks coercion and military effect are not absent, yet they are less central than in traditional defence activities. The second direction of the move – inward-looking – would mean that NATO plays an increased role in the defence against internal threats, by contributing to: critical infrastructure protection and resilience building; civilian protection tasks; police-type activities such as anti-terrorist operations in European capitals; operations that aim to tackle the security consequences of (massive) migrant flows; or support to police forces facing under-the- radar hybrid-type non-conventional attacks. This would imply establishing relations with a set of national actors, from law enforcement entities to municipalities, public companies (in the energy and transport sectors among others) and the private sector (Machi 2017). The role of NATO in these various activities could vary in ambition, spanning information- sharing, awareness rising, coordination, exercises, and more operational tasks. The implied risks of task expansion Although these various tasks make sense when assessed against the broad security needs of NATO member states and societies, and may be justified for political reasons, they carry a number of risks of maladaptation. First, NATO would have to further develop or acquire an expertise on issues that can be very technical, or human resources-heavy, and for which even the member states may have a deficit (as in the cyber domain, energy security, or critical infrastructure protection). The added-value of NATO’s role would be all the more challenged as its expertise is being ques- tioned. Second, the legitimacy of NATO’s role in some areas may be challenged due to a lack of expertise or because of the possible intrusiveness of NATO’s activities; this leads to sover- eignty considerations, with states – be they NATO member states or not – having issues with any attempt from NATO to interfere with their internal sphere, in the law enforcement domain for example. Third, any task expansion would require a degree of consensus within member states on the merits of the enlarged mandate, and this will prove to be difficult, as illustrated by the sensitivities of broadening NATO’s agenda towards the South, to include counter-terrorism and migration policies for example (NATO official 2019). Even an agreement on broadening NATO’s mandate on the Eastern flank to embrace security issues would be difficult. Securitisation is inherently subjective (Buzan and Waever 2003, Sperling and Webber 2016); it is the outcome of a political choice that in turn results from an intersub- jective understanding of what constitutes a threat. It follows that consensus-building on newly identified threats or policies is all the more difficult. Fourth, the broad security field is already crowded with institutions that in some areas would appear in a stronger position. NATO’s positioning on the broad field of activities would potentially duplicate existing capacities, and place it in direct competition with others, often in a weaker position. From the SSR domain in Sub-Saharan Africa to police or border tasks within European states, actors like the EU, national administrations, police forces and NGOs would not necessarily welcome a NATO role. Fifth, any broadening of NATO’s mandate would be resisted as it would carry the risk of diluting NATO’s war-fighting capability. Contemporary war-fighting is arguably politically, financially and operationally demanding; any parallel effort can, there- fore, be seen as a deleterious diversion (see Stapleton 2016). Cyber security provides a good example of these risks. Cyber is arguably a key dimen- sion of NATO’s mission. It is part of “NATO’s core task of collective defence”, and its qua- lification as an operational domain implies that NATO “must be able to operate as effectively in cyberspace as [it does] in the air, on land, and at sea to strengthen and support the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence posture” (NATO 2018, para. 20) At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies have also stated that a cyber attack could lead to the invo- cation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Furthermore, NATO has developed a fair amount of doctrinal and policy documents in that domain. Yet the extent to which NATO can play an important role in cyber security is uncertain for reasons that have to do with expertise, capabilities, the nature of the threat and of its possible targets, and therefore the nature of the response.

#### Expanding NATO capacity creates divisions in the alliance over how to balance increased capacity with a focus on Russia

Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning in 2021

NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish; Survival, 63:5, 147-168, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203

The problem, rather, was that NATO’s new course of action was so hard¶ fought politically that a revision of the Strategic Concept was always out of¶ the question. The most exposed eastern allies vocally demanded a ‘defence¶ first’ policy whereby NATO would build up significant defence measures¶ and only then open a dialogue with Russia. Other allies, including Germany,¶ sought a more balanced ‘dual-track’ approach that would leave the door¶ open to dialogue with Russia. Still other allies worried that NATO would¶ become engulfed by its ‘eastern flank’ to the detriment of ‘southern flank’¶ crisis management and counter-terrorism, and wished to balance these¶ geographical concerns. These debates had taken a distinct toll on NATO’s¶ political capacity for setting new priorities when, in January 2017, NATO¶ became politically consumed by the existential challenge posed by Trump.¶ There was thus no political energy for upgrading the conceptual¶ basis for NATO’s new-found defence and deterrence posture to the level¶ of a Strategic Concept. A secret ‘Principles and Key Tenets of Credible¶ Deterrence and Defence’ paper written in 2016 had led NATO to do more:¶ to scale up its forward forces, reaction forces, training and exercises, and¶ more.26 However, the Alliance had remained limited by the assumption¶ that ‘doing more’ equalled deterrence. Perhaps this was all that a¶ politically divided alliance could hope for – a type of deterrence based on¶ a unified posture rather than a political–military strategy. However, the¶ objection raised by military planners was that deterrence is nothing unless¶ it is anchored in a deeper assessment of how clear threats play out in¶ geographic terms. In short, to really deter Russia, NATO needed to assess¶ both its own and Russia’s ‘centres of gravity’ and align NATO actions to¶ achieve desired military effects.¶ This concern was pervasive among NATO’s International Military Staff¶ through 2016,27 when, according to our sources, key US actors – and in particular¶ the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford (who¶ represented the United States on NATO’s Military Committee) – started to¶ press for changes in NATO’s military planning. The outcome was the 2019¶ military strategy. General Dunford acted in response not only to the concerns¶ of NATO’s International Military Staff but also to a 2015 US National¶ Military Strategy that defined allies as critical to the execution of ‘globally¶ integrated operations’, an emphasis that then-secretary of defense James¶ Mattis retained in the United States’ 2018 National Military Strategy.28¶ If General Dunford had felt it necessary to set changes in motion in 2016–17,¶ this impulse was only heightened when British Air Chief Marshal Stuart¶ Peach, who shared Dunford’s ideas, assumed the chairmanship of NATO’s¶ Military Committee in June 2018.¶ The trouble was that, as energy levels on the military side were increasing,¶ they were deflating on the political side. Dunford and Peach teamed¶ up around the same time that NATO heads of state and government were¶ meeting in Brussels under the threat that Trump would withdraw the¶ United States from NATO. It was a ‘wild ride’, as former US national security¶ advisor John Bolton put it in his memoir, and one that left NATO with a¶ growing political–military divide.29¶ Who’s in charge?¶ Multiple allies felt taken by surprise by the advanced nature of the thinking¶ that went into NATO’s military strategy. When General Dunford remarked¶ in May 2019 that NATO now had, for the first time ‘in decades’, a military¶ strategy that ‘clearly articulates the challenges that confront NATO’ and¶ ‘provides the framework for the various plans that will be in place if deterrence¶ fails’, he highlighted not only the benefits of an enhanced framework¶ for military planning but also, inadvertently, the political shortcomings of¶ the Alliance’s strategic leadership.30 Some allies felt a need to push back.¶ Tellingly, the United States and the United Kingdom were not among¶ them. American and British military authorities had led the charge and¶ considered both the new military strategy and the derivative theatre-wide¶ DDA as having been politically approved and ready to go.31 Other allies,¶ however, continue to have reservations with regard to the Russia-centric¶ nature of the strategy, and attach importance to a subtle distinction whereby¶ they have merely ‘noted’ the military strategy but explicitly ‘approved’ the¶ DDA. In fact, these allies have sought to contain the 2019 military strategy¶ and to control the 2020 DDA-led process. As noted, they have arrested the¶ overarching threat assessment, pushing for an upgrade of the role of the¶ southern flank. A revised Strategic Concept will have to find a way to balance¶ between Russia-related collective defence and southern counter-terrorism¶ and capacity-building. For now, the southern flank has won a stronger¶ foothold in the DDA, which henceforth will contain a Sequenced Response¶ Plan – which is comparable to the Russia-centric Graduated Response Plans¶ – to address southern contingencies. This is merely a warm-up for a grander¶ political debate, however.

#### Expanding NATO’s strategic mission hurts cohesion by distracting from conventional deterrence of Russia

Larsen 5-22 (Henrik Larsen, senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China,” Lawfare, May 22 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china)-amc

From a European perspective, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks a new reality of increased defense spending that will likely redress some of the military imbalance between the United States and European NATO allies since the end of the Cold War. It is positive that the United States seeks cooperation on a wider array of security issues, such as trade and technology, that are core to a resilient and united transatlantic alliance. At the same time, it is continental Europe, not North America and the United Kingdom, that risks emerging as a weak transatlantic link under growing Russian and Chinese influence and, therefore, must make the necessary adjustment. The vagueness of U.S. expectations and the questionable durability of U.S. leadership seems to give European allies more leverage in defining the alliance’s strategic outlook on resilience. Restricting nontrusted technology and economic investments and fighting foreign subversion are mostly national decisions, but the European Union has exclusive powers with regard to trade and coordinates significant assets in other areas. The European allies can shape the U.S. push for NATO’s functional expansion by clarifying four areas in which the alliance can add value to transatlantic resilience.

### OCOs

#### NATO wide cooperation doesn’t solve issues over cohesion and division- there will still be different interpretations and priorities among member states

Max Smeets in 2019

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But there are constraints on a NATO wide-memorandum, too. To start, not all states are equally willing to share intelligence information. A bilateral agreement would make it easier to tailor the notification equity framework to the specific preferences and capabilities of both governments.¶ II. Can It Be Used as a Public Signaling Device?¶ The notification equity framework part of the memorandum of understanding can remain classified. Governments might not get it right the first time. As the framework might need tweaking, immediate public disclosure is risky. But a public version, if crafted carefully, can also help to set the parameters of what Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett call “agreed competition.” That is, it can help clarify where adversaries are allowed and not allowed to go within each other’s networks. If we want stability in cyberspace, this is a mechanism by which to achieve it.¶ III. Should the Memorandum Also Address Cyber Operations Beyond Allied Networks?¶ A memorandum of understanding narrow in scope—that is, addressing the allies’ conduct of cyber effect operations taking place only in systems or networks in allied territory—would ignore the negative impact on allied intelligence operations and capabilities beyond these systems and networks.¶ Military cyber organizations are operating in a global environment historically dominated by intelligence agencies, and the Five Eyes has always been the most dominant actor in cyberspace. But the anglophone intelligence alliance is not the only intelligence actor operating across the world. Recent cases—such as the Dutch ’s General Intelligence and Security Service infiltration into the Russia-based network of the infamous hacking group Cozy Bear—have illustrated the continued global prevalence and value of allies’ intelligence operations beyond the Five Eyes alliance.¶ If military cyber organizations increasingly take up the role of “disrupter,” it may negatively impact global intelligence collection of allies—particularly those countries that favor long-term access over immediate effect. It will also more likely uncover and burn allied capabilities.¶ The risks of occurring are higher than one may think as intelligence agencies have a tendency and incentive to target and track the same entities. For example, in late 2014, cybersecurity company Kaspersky Lab reported on the Magnet of Threats. The cybersecurity company discovered a server belonging to a research organization in the Middle East that simultaneously hosted implants for at least five Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors: Regin and the Equation Group (English language), Turla and ItaDuke (Russian language), Animal Farm (French language) and Careto (Spanish language). Consider what would have happened if one of those five APT groups had sought to cause a disruptive effect—rather than collect intelligence—against the target in the Middle East. It likely would have resulted in much earlier discovery and analysis by threat intelligence companies (or other actors) exposing the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of each actor group.¶ Also, even the anticipation of more cyber effect operations in nonallied networks from one allied state could lead to a change in operations by another state. Indeed, states have shown in the past that the anticipation of early discovery of an operation has led to a change in their TTPs. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) created an “exploit orchestrator” called FoxAcid, an Internet-enabled system capable of attacking target computers in a variety of different ways, depending on whether it is discovered—or likely to be discovered—in a given network. FoxAcid has a modular design, with flexibility allowing the NSA to swap and replace exploits and run different exploits based on various considerations. Against technically sophisticated targets where the chance of detection is high, FoxAcid would normally choose to run low-value exploits.¶ Not a Silver Bullet¶ While I argue that the NATO memorandum of understanding on offensive cyber operations in systems or networks based in allied territory can greatly help in promoting stability and enhancing confidence among allies, it is not a silver bullet. It can only reduce allied concerns rather than mitigate them. Military cyber organizations may still conduct effect-based operations in allied territory without consent, leading allies to assert that their sovereignty has been violated. And there’s another crucial player involved. As Gen. Nakasone noted in the Joint Force Quarterly article, cyberspace is owned largely by the private sector. They deserve a seat at the table as well.

#### NATO’s conventional deterrence is sufficient now- adding cyber to their core strategy risks disrupting the mission

Jeppe T Jacobsen in 2021

Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark; International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 3, May 2021, Pages 703–720, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab010

The article makes three arguments in support of the overall argument that¶ NATO will (and should) continue to play only a limited offensive role in cyberspace. First, it identifies four distinct cyber effects from the current debates on¶ major cyber incidents presented in the cyber-conflict literature. This is done in¶ order to assess the operational challenges and possibilities for successful integration of sovereign cyber effects in NATO operations, also known as SCEPVA.8¶ As¶ cyber effects are often costly in time and resources to develop, difficult to predict¶ and verify, and involve a risk of confliction, it is argued that the types of offensive¶ cyber operations that are highly destructive and specialized, with a view to enabling ¶ other (kinetic) military effects, are the most difficult to integrate. In contrast, less¶ complex disruptions used to persistently annoy and confuse adversaries hold more¶ promise. In order to work in NATO, these effects require more flexibility in the¶ way CYOC sends requests to and interacts with the member states.¶ Second, in the light of the renewed scholarly attention being given to NATO’s¶ capacity to deter Russia, the article unpacks and assesses the suggestion that a¶ centre for integrating offensive cyber effects contributes to NATO’s deterrence¶ posture.9¶ It assesses the addition of cyber effects to NATO’s operational toolbox¶ in the light of the (hybrid) threat environment which is currently being articulated¶ in NATO, and argues that such integration adds little to the existing deterrence¶ posture. NATO’s superior conventional capabilities—with or without cyber¶ effects—already threaten punishment to adversaries who may consider invading¶ allied countries. Yet CYOC and the alliance as a whole do not deter the more¶ frequent (hybrid) cyber activity against member states that does not reach the¶ threshold of armed conflict.¶ To elaborate on this argument, the article addresses, thirdly, the question of¶ misinterpretation and escalation in cyberspace. Despite being potentially counterintuitive to those scholars who advocate a stronger NATO deterrence posture, the¶ limited offensive role of NATO in cyberspace and the alliance’s inability to deter¶ the majority of malicious cyber activity against member states is not necessarily¶ a problem. In fact, the article argues that the reason why we have yet to experience serious misinterpretation in cyberspace is that most states’ cyber activities¶ seem implicitly to accept an intelligence norm in cyberspace that embraces acting¶ in legal grey zones and staying under the threshold of armed conflict. This norm¶ has offered an additional option on the escalation ladder below armed attack,¶ but its continuation is contingent on an intelligence logic—and not a military¶ logic—being the dominant way of thinking in cyberspace. As the current strategic¶ adaptation represents a return to a more conventional military way of thinking,¶ NATO’s move to present a dominant military force in cyberspace risks undermining the status quo—which, so far, has avoided rapid escalation.

### Tech Focus

#### Plan leads to divisiveness among NATO members over strategy- some members prefer tech development outside of NATO to foster European autonomy-aff reinvigorates debates over dependence on the US

Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Alexander Vershbow et al 6/24/22

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Vladimir Putin’s greatest achievement thus far in renewing his brutal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine has been to reinvigorate the Atlantic alliance. North American-European unity has been remarkable, exemplified by harsh and complementary sanctions against Russia; efforts to wean Europe off its dangerous dependence on Russian energy; military, financial, and political support for Ukraine; and actions to strengthen NATO’s own defense.¶ A more corrosive effect of Putin’s war, however, has been to deepen even further Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States — a trend that had already become unsustainable even before the conflict began. As the alliance continues its most urgent task — helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s assault — it must address this important longer-term challenge of rebalancing trans-Atlantic defense.¶ Doing so means squaring a triangle of issues: ensuring Europe’s capacity to defend itself against Russia and manage a range of additional crises, many along its southern periphery; addressing European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy; and maintaining confidence that the United States can adequately uphold its commitments in both the north Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.¶ THE AUTONOMY MUDDLE¶ The term “strategic autonomy,” popular in some European circles and anathema in others, stems originally from an earlier discourse within the French strategic community to describe France’s ambition to boost its military capabilities and reduce its dependencies so that it could act alone if necessary to protect French interests, beginning with crisis management operations in Africa and along Europe’s southern periphery. Of course, the European Union (EU) has been trying to develop its capacity for military action for some decades. Yet it was only in 2016 that the “strategic autonomy” term was lifted to the EU level, with the publication of the bloc’s Global Strategy. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not define the notion’s content or its implications.[2]¶ In the years that followed, the term gained traction in some EU countries as concerns in Europe mounted about U.S. reliability as an ally under President Donald Trump, China’s rising technological and norm-setting challenges, and signs that the EU could be trampled as the American and Chinese elephants collided. Debate was further energized by signs of faltering European technological prowess, and especially by the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed European dependencies across a number of health-related sectors.¶ Over time, the term began to assume a far more expansive meaning. European concerns have spawned a raft of related phrases, such as “European sovereignty,” “economic sovereignty,” “health sovereignty,” “technological sovereignty,” “data sovereignty,” “cybersecurity sovereignty,” even “digital strategic autonomy.” The result, as one European observer noted, is a “muddle of words.”¶ European commentators and leaders cloud things further by interpreting these assorted phrases very differently, according to their diverse strategic cultures, threat perceptions, and calculations of self-interest.¶ Taken together, however, this jumble conveys a shared and deeply-felt anxiety among many Europeans that their grand experiment of integration is being imperiled by internal weaknesses and external forces. In all of its forms, the autonomy narrative is meant to generate EU-wide consensus behind ambitious and often-costly initiatives to bolster the bloc’s technological, industrial, and norm-setting capabilities in ways that their proponents believe can preserve European competitiveness, lower strategic dependencies, raise the EU’s ability to resist geopolitical or geoeconomic coercion, and give it more freedom to maneuver and shape its environment.¶ Until Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a theme central to the “strategic autonomy” narrative was that the EU needed to be able to act autonomously, without the United States. Since then, however, Europe has become more rather than less reliant on the United States. And while “strategic autonomy” remains popular in some European countries, it rankled opinion in others, especially given the increased urgency of deterring and defending against a revanchist Russia. Policymakers in Finland, Estonia, and the Netherlands, among others, prefer to talk about Europe’s strategic responsibility, which entails more substantial contributions to regional security, the readiness and ability to act together rather than alone, and downplays implicit tradeoffs between a strong Europe and a strong trans-Atlantic partnership.

#### Expanding NATO strategy to focus on disruptive technologies leads to internal conflict over priorities- allies perceive that it trades off with deterrence of Russia

Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning in 2021

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The distinct risk of this charge is that it will add to NATO’s political–¶ military tensions. Stoltenberg’s London mandate, and therefore the work of¶ the Reflection Group, was entirely political: there was no built-in requirement¶ to seek political–military coherence. Moreover, even if Stoltenberg has¶ so far confined the Strategic Concept debate to the headquarters of the¶ North Atlantic Council, thereby avoiding extensive committee work and¶ negotiations, he will not be able to imitate Rasmussen’s tightly controlled¶ process in 2010. In fact, NATO leaders have stipulated that while the¶ secretary-general should ‘lead’ the Strategic Concept process, the text ‘will¶ be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed¶ by NATO Leaders at the next Summit’.38¶ The upside is that allied buy-in will increase compared with 2010 and¶ thereafter. The downside is that the temptation to be expansive in terms of¶ priorities could grow. The 2020 Reflection Group, steered by the secretarygeneral,¶ notably did not call for the slimming of NATO’s core tasks.39 In a¶ bid to build a consensus, the secretary-general may feel tempted to lengthen¶ the list of core tasks, perhaps by adding resilience, disruptive technology,¶ pandemics and natural disasters. This temptation will be all the stronger¶ given that, in the meantime, NATO has decided to ‘mainstream’ the challenges¶ posed by China into the Alliance’s many policy portfolios.40¶ In short, NATO is approaching a revised Strategic Concept with, on the¶ one hand, a political temptation to go big and, on the other, a Russia-centric¶ approach to military planning. To steer clear of further political–military¶ tensions and even rupture, NATO allies should 1) prioritise collective¶ defence; 2) develop a values-based narrative; and 3) intensify its internal¶ political–military dialogue.

### US Link

#### The US will cause NATO fracture over the plan- the will push for development that benefits US industry and fight against European autonomy

Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Alexander Vershbow et al 6/24/22

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U.S. support for greater European defense efforts has always been conditional. Successive U.S. administrations have supported European moves to bolster their defense capabilities, provided that such efforts would strengthen, rather than weaken, the political cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. Those conditions were framed most prominently in 1998 by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Following a U.K.-France meeting at St. Malo, at which London and Paris declared that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action,” Secretary Albright penned a piece in the Financial Times stating that U.S. support for greater European efforts would be contingent on avoiding “three D’s:” discrimination against non-EU NATO members, decoupling of European and North American security, and duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its command structure. “No duplication” was neither defined nor intended to mean that Europe should not develop certain capabilities that already existed in the alliance; indeed, much of the Clinton administration’s efforts at the time, such as the NATO Defense Capability Initiative, sought to prod the Europeans into developing precisely such capabilities. This distinction has been lost on analysts who have posited that the United States has opposed any European moves to improve their capacity to act.[3]¶ U.S. concerns have centered more on the danger of competition and duplication with NATO structures and planning processes, along with doubts about the capacity of European militaries to conduct even small-scale operations without U.S. support. While the United States has consistently pressed European allies for greater defense contributions, it has preferred that such efforts be undertaken to strengthen NATO, rather than to enhance independent efforts that it feared could drain attention away from common defense efforts. Competition between U.S. and European defense contractors has exacerbated tensions over these issues.

https://www.justsecurity.org/81839/natos-2022-strategic-concept-must-enhance-digital-access-and-capacities/

## Impacts

### Now Key

#### Now is a key time- failure to maintain cohesion risks a fundamental alliance rift

Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning in 2021

NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish; Survival, 63:5, 147-168, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203

NATO’s post-Crimea adaptation tells the story. NATO responded with¶ political vigour, condemning Russia and placing the burden of change on¶ Moscow while bolstering its own defence and deterrence posture. However,¶ internal political limitations meant that NATO did not develop its thinking¶ on the nature of the threat and the effects that would serve to deter it. By¶ 2016, when Trump burst onto the scene, NATO’s capacity for such in-depth¶ political thinking seemed non-existent. The military authorities seized the¶ initiative, crafting a new military strategy centred on desired effects and¶ deterrence. This first real strategy since the adoption in 1967 of NATO’s¶ Flexible Response strategy was then met with political ambivalence.¶ NATO needs to get its strategic house in order. The political–military¶ divide outlined in this article is real but not yet alarming; a failure to tend¶ to it in the new Strategic Concept would sound the alarm. Confronting¶ Russia while competing with China, digesting the lessons of Afghanistan¶ and developing a range of policy competences in cyber, resilience, outer¶ space, capacity-building and more is indeed a tall political order. Strategy is¶ about priorities, however, and NATO’s priorities must bridge the political–¶ military divide. Thus, the new Strategic Concept could do worse than¶ establish collective defence as an overriding priority; wrap it in a narrative¶ of democratic values necessitating both a rebalanced NATO and collective¶ defence; and invite continuous political–military dialogue on military¶ technology and its strategic implications.

#### Now is a key time to foster NATO unity- fragmentation undermines US leadership globally

McRaven et.al 4-20 (WILLIAM  H. MCRAVEN, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014, PETER ORSZAG is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008, THEODORE BUNZEL, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department, “Made in the Alliance: How to Shore up the Foundations of Transatlantic Solidarity” Foreign Affairs, April 20 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance)-amc>

The Biden administration can also use the crisis in Ukraine as an opportunity to reshape the military landscape and [revitalize U.S. leadership](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-03-14/return-pax-americana) on the continent. One element of that should be an increase in the size of the U.S. military presence in Europe. That should include enhancing the U.S. posture in the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley recently suggested. The United States should set up permanent bases on the eastern flank of NATO to help reassure allies on the front lines of Russian aggression, significantly bolstering the pre-crisis rotational presence that numbered only in the low thousands. This could include at least three additional U.S. Army brigade-equivalent units permanently stationed in Poland, Romania, and Germany that would continually rotate through other vulnerable eastern flank nations, including the Baltics. This should be coupled with enhancing U.S. naval presence in the waters of the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic, increasing both consistent deployments and naval exercises with our Western partners. NATO, meanwhile, can be enhanced both by welcoming Sweden and Finland, which are newly considering membership, and by tightening NATO ties with critical Pacific allies—turning the NATO alliance into an essential hub of Western military cooperation around the globe. The recent NATO announcement on enhanced cooperation with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea was a good step. This cooperation should be codified in NATO’s Strategic Concept at the upcoming Madrid Summit in June, and include more frequent military exercises and exchanges, both in Europe and the Pacific. Such steps are necessary even as the war in Ukraine continues to rage. The opportunity that the United States has today—to revitalize the transatlantic alliance for the long haul—won’t last long. If used wisely, it can reinforce military cooperation while building a super bloc of Western economies. Letting it slip by would be a massive—and unforced—strategic error.

### Deterrence Impact

#### Reviving NATO deterrence is key to avoid war with Russia – MAD checks escalation.

Gorodnichenko and Becker 22 [Yuriy Gorodnichenko is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. Torbjörn Becker is Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. “NATO Must Get MAD at Russia”. 17-03-2022. Project Syndicate. [https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-russia-nuclear-threat-mutual-assured-destruction-by-yuriy-gorodnichenko-and-torbjorn-becker-2022-03. Accessed 6-30-2022](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-russia-nuclear-threat-mutual-assured-destruction-by-yuriy-gorodnichenko-and-torbjorn-becker-2022-03.%20Accessed%206-30-2022); MJen]

Russia has shown that it is ready to murder innocent Ukrainians, but it is not ready to commit suicide. And that holds the key to preventing further Russian aggression, and more unspeakable tragedies, in Ukraine and elsewhere. BERKELEY/STOCKHOLM – Anyone who does not want war would do well to recall an enduring lesson from the Cold War: parties will be deterred from fighting if they know in advance that they will lose everything. With Russian President Vladimir Putin threatening to use nuclear weapons if the West tries to intervene militarily in Ukraine, NATO must revive the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The logic of MAD was dismal but not crazy. Both the Soviet Union and the United States (or any other NATO member) knew that if one attacked the other, it would be annihilated in response. The key to the MAD equilibrium was that the aggressor’s annihilation would be assured if it launched an attack. This guarantee that the other side would retaliate with full force took a variety of forms, from the nuclear triad to the hardline stance of military commanders like former US Air Force General Curtis LeMay. The result was that neither superpower wanted to attack first, keeping the Cold War cold. MAD may have seemed obsolete after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, but Putin’s recent nuclear threats have raised troubling questions that the doctrine helps to address. For example, would the West retaliate if Russia used nuclear weapons against Ukraine and a radioactive cloud covered Europe? What if the Russian army blew up a nuclear power plant in Ukraine? Where does one draw the line? The West’s common theme in such scenarios must be to assure Russia of inevitable consequences. This means committing to strike back and communicating to Russia that even a “small” nuclear attack or accident would trigger a devastating response. The potentially blurred boundaries of what constitutes an attack (a Russian missile might hit a NATO base or convoy, for example) broadens the range of triggers. In the 1950s, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles indicated that any attack – with conventional or nuclear forces – would lead to the aggressor’s annihilation. Furthermore, the MAD logic dictates that one can achieve de-escalation through escalation. If Russia adopts an aggressive posture and puts its nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles on a high state of readiness, NATO must respond in kind to signal that it is ready to react. A failure to do so could be interpreted as a lack of commitment and thus invite more aggressive Russian behavior. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis involved a real-life application of the MAD strategy. By placing nuclear missiles on Cuba, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev intended to scare the US and thus extract concessions from President John F. Kennedy, whom Khrushchev perceived to be “soft.” Had the Kennedy administration caved in, Khrushchev’s nuclear blackmail would have terrorized the US for years. Understanding the MAD logic, Kennedy responded by placing US strategic forces at DEFCON 2 (ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours). Facing the prospect of triggering a nuclear war (DEFCON 1) and ensuring mutual annihilation, Khrushchev backed down, the crisis was defused, and the Soviet Union never again risked a nuclear confrontation with NATO. The 1961 US-Soviet standoff at Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin was a similar case of escalation resulting in long-term de-escalation: the Soviet bloc never again questioned West Berlin’s status. Unfortunately, the world seems to have forgotten the importance of standing up to a bully with nuclear weapons. Remember that MAD was about the balance of terror: lose the balance and all that remains is terror. Today, NATO must balance Russian threats to use nukes with a commitment to retaliate in kind, and meet Putin’s escalation with escalation of its own. In a MAD world, caving in to nuclear intimidation is a sign of weakness that makes a war more likely.

#### Prioritizing deterrence is key to prevent Russian aggression

Kochis et. al, ‘22 (Daniel Kochis, senior policy analyst in European affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Thomas W. Spoehr, Director for the Center for National Defense, Patty-Jane Geller, Senior Policy Analyst on Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense at the Center for National Defense, Luke Coffey, Former Director for the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, “The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time”, The Heritage Foundation, March 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-russian-threat-bolstering-nato-deterrence-critical-time)-amc

The security and prosperity of the transatlantic community, including the United States, rests on the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s ongoing war of naked aggression against Ukraine, a NATO non-member state, should put to rest any lingering questions about the modern utility of the Alliance and about which threat should be the focus of NATO’s upcoming strategic concept. The answer is clear: The U.S. must lead the Alliance to a wholesale refocusing on the organization’s raison d’être of collective defense. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to the increased threat from Russia. Deterrence measures should include an Alliance-wide recommitment to defense spending; a persistent and continuing U.S. presence in Eastern European member states; updated Alliance operational planning in light of Russia’s position in Belarus and Ukraine; and an increase in U.S. air, ground, and naval forces in the European theater as a sign of continued commitment to the NATO treaty’s Article 5. These deterrence measures must be carried out with the recognition that, from a long-term perspective, China is the largest peer challenger from whom the U.S. must expect hostile action. Any improvements to the U.S. force posture must not be to the detriment of the nation’s ability to counter China. From the Arctic to the Levant, Russia remains an aggressive and capable threat to NATO and the interests of its members. For member states in Eastern Europe, Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat. Russia’s entrenched position in Belarus, along with its ongoing actions to cleave Ukraine, a nation that borders four NATO members, in two, scramble the geostrategic map of Europe and necessitate changes to NATO operational planning, exemplifying the need for the Alliance to take swift and resolute steps to bolster deterrence measures along its eastern flank.

### Russia War/Miscalc

#### Unified NATO key to deter Russia, prevent miscalc, and maintain international stability

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Following his election victory, Prime Minister Trudeau and his new government urgently need to address the multiple security and foreign policy challenges facing Canada and our allies. These include the persistent and growing threats of foreign interference and cyber operations targeting Canada, and the danger of Russia and China’s transnational repression, human rights violations and aggression in Europe, Asia and beyond. Of particular concern to Canada and its Northern allies is the Kremlin’s rapid militarization of the Arctic and Russia’s recent claim to all the resources under the entire Arctic Sea – right up to Canada’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. This, coupled with China’s expanding interest in the region, represents a potential future challenge to Canada’s sovereignty and mobility in the High North. Canada’s allies on NATO’s Eastern flank continue to face various forms of aggression from Russia and Belarus, including information warfare and other forms of grey-zone hybrid aggression. Most recently, the Lukashenka regime in Belarus has weaponized thousands of innocent migrants who have been lured to Belarus from Iraq and elsewhere, and then forced to cross into Lithuania, Latvia and Poland by Belarusian authorities. The migrants are used to destabilize border regions and incite domestic political conflict. Many of these issues were discussed during a high-level dialogue on Canadian and Baltic Sea region security and cooperation, hosted by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. The dialogue highlighted the strengths of some of the approaches Canada has taken, lead among them being the Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission in Latvia and Operation Unifier in Ukraine. Canada’s leadership of the eFP in Latvia helps strengthen the transatlantic relationship beyond the obvious security considerations. Through it, Canada can raise its diplomatic profile and develop significant and lasting linkages between government officials, diplomats, and experts in the Baltic Sea region. Thus, when Canada faces challenging issues such as the arbitrary detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor by China, NATO members can be counted on to support us. Most importantly, the eFP represents clear, meaningful, and targeted deterrence. It imposes significant cost if the Russian government engages in hostile action against the Baltic states or Poland. It draws a definitive red line, which if violated will result in significant consequences. However, NATO’s deterrence operations remain largely limited to conventional warfare and do not yet fully cover evolving hybrid and grey-zone threats – including information warfare and other forms of interference operations. The Canadian Armed Forces have endeavoured to address the threat of disinformation, but those efforts have been hindered by a series of unfortunate missteps and domestic misinformation about them. Conversely, Canada’s Baltic allies have developed robust strategies to build broad social and political resilience against foreign disinformation and influence operations. Canada should be working with them and NATO to form a common strategy to deter non-linear types of warfare and aggression, which threaten our democratic processes, institutions and social cohesion. Cautious engagement with our adversaries should remain one tool within our broader diplomatic tool kit. Yet Canada should learn from the experiences of our allies and recognize that states like Russia and China are not constrained by the same respect for transparency, democratic values, or the rule of law. The Canadian government should be aware that foreign regimes may engage in the theatre of diplomacy to distract from their true intentions and actions. There is also concern that tolerating Russian aggression and advocating for greater engagement and integration may only further encourage bad behaviour. In the case of Nord Stream 2, for example, some NATO members have knowingly increased European dependence on Russian energy resources despite the Kremlin’s well documented use of energy as a political tool. A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow. If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats. Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole. If we are to succeed in tackling these shared threats, greater transatlantic cooperation is needed. It cannot remain stagnant, however; it must evolve and expand. The serious nature of the threats, their potential to become kinetic, and the possibility of adversarial coordination (whether formal or informal) means that we must expand our tools to meet these challenges. In the case of Ukraine, on whose border the Kremlin mobilized over 100,000 troops this past summer, the Alliance should consider extending a Membership Action Plan despite the skepticism of some allies. Ukraine must also be empowered in a similar fashion to frontline NATO states like the Baltic states and Poland. After all, the eFP mission in Latvia not only provides military deterrence, but strengthens interlinkages, develops societal resilience, and provides clear and sustained solidarity. Finally, the growing threats of foreign interference, information warfare, cyber attacks and emerging threats to Canada’s Arctic requires a coherent long-term strategy and an evolved notion of collective defence, which includes strengthening our partnerships with non-NATO allies in Europe, Asia, and around the world. Until we impose consequences that force Moscow and Beijing to strategically reconsider their ongoing efforts to probe the extreme boundaries of our threat tolerance, they will continue to test our capacity and political will to confront their aggression. This requires a common understanding and acknowledgement of the threats. It took Russian aggression in 2007 in Estonia, 2008 in Georgia, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to achieve a basic common understanding of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s government. Since then, NATO’s eFP missions have thus far deterred Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions in the Baltic Sea region. We must work towards achieving a similar consensus on the threats posed by Russia and China’s use of information and influence operations, as well as economic, cyber and political warfare against the community of democracies and the developing world at large in order to develop resilience and a common defence against them.

#### Russia will exploit divisions between NATO members to instigate nuclear crises---extinction.

Kulesa ’18 [Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>]

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed?¶ Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions.¶ Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.¶ Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses.¶ Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.¶ The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.¶ With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.¶ Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.¶ Conflict termination¶ Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate.

#### Breaking NATO causes Russian aggression that escalates to nuclear war

Beauchamp 18

[Zack, senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, “How Trump is killing America’s alliances,” 6/12/18, <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7>]

How **the weakening of American alliances could lead to a massive war.**There has never, in human history, been an era as peaceful as our own. This is a hard truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the University of Oxford’s Max Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically powerful countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500 years. The decline is unmistakable: [[TABLE OMITTED]] This data should give you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European powers like Britain and France and Spain were warring constantly. The frequency of conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out — the Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past 70 years without great power war, a period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of history’s most wonderful anomalies. The question then becomes: Why did it happen? And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American alliances, put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes. **There is significant evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and South Korea — have been instrumental in putting an end to great power war. “As this alliance system spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented drop, in warfare,”** says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at Tufts University. “**It’s a really, really strong correlation.”**A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a large data set on alliances between 1816 and 2000. They found that countries in defensive alliances were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflict, on average, than countries that weren’t. **This holds true even after you control for other factors that would affect the likelihood of war**, like whether a country is a democracy or whether it has an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson looked at the same data set to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that alliances deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies take seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack. The core US alliances — NATO, Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly. A third study finds evidence that alliances allow allies to restrain each other from going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a conflict somewhere. Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America thinks it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical evidence that countries don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally would disapprove. These three findings all suggest that **NATO and America’s East Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving the Long Peace** — which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous. According to many Russia experts, Vladimir **Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO.** The member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if and when a rival like Putin would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try testing them. Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of America’s allies, the more likely things are to change. **The absolute risk of a Russian invasion of a NATO state** or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low, but the consequences **are so potentially catastrophic — nuclear war! — that it’s worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously.** The crack-up of the West? The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game, there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable tower. Each player has to remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The international order works in kind of the same way. There are lots of different interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out one block and the other ones might not be strong enough to keep things together on their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the passing of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French President François Mitterrand told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some experts feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western European powers might go back to waging war with each other. Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But **if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up.**America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. **The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries** or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. **When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up. Nothing like this — the leader of the world’s hegemon rounding on its most important allies — has ever happened before**. What Donald Trump’s presidency has done, in effect, is start up another geopolitical Jenga game. Slowly but surely, he’s removing the blocks that undergird global security. It’s possible the global order survives Trump — but it’s just too early for us to say for sure. **Given the stakes, it’s a game we’d rather not play.**

#### NATO missions fail without internal alliance cohesion.

Mierzwa & Tomaszycki ’21 (Danuta Mierzwa, Marek Tomaszycki; Danuta Mierzwa is General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces in Wrocław, PL; Marek Tomaszycki is General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces: Wrocław, PL; 7/5/21; “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept”; https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41311-021-00332-1.pdf)//akg

The Alliance of NATO, since its inception, has been based on four main pillars: ideological, political, economic and military. Ideologically, the Member States share fundamental principles such as individual freedom, democracy, the rule of law and sovereignty of the state. Politically, there is a necessity for consensus among the member states on common interests, objectives and commitments. From the economic viewpoint, the Allies pledge to incur the designated military expenditures and other security-related expenditures—they commit to cost-sharing. With regard to the military organization, NATO is based on the principle of strong, integrated, organized, well-trained, efective and mobile troops. NATO achieves its objectives by upscaling its readiness, response and military capabilities to deter an adversary. It aims at maintaining military forces in the right place and time capable of deterring or, if necessary, repelling an adversary. In this context, NATO leaders, who are aware of the fact that unity is essential for success, comply with the principles of “cohesion” and “coherence”. Hence, “cohesion” and “coherence” have become distinctive indicators of NATO’s current strategic concept. According to the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “the Alliance that cannot ensure collective defence loses cohesion in achieving collective security”. In order to clarify the principles that are crucial for the implementation of the new strategy, it is necessary to understand what “NATO’s cohesion” and “NATO’s coherence” mean.1 NATO’s cohesion means a level of political and ideological unity as well as solidarity between the members of the Pact. It mainly refers to the principles on which the Alliance is based. This is particularly true of the Member States’ commitment to collective defence, threats and challenges facing the Alliance. NATO’s coherence refers to consensus among the Member States in order to guarantee the Alliance’s capabilities and capacities necessary to ensure the efective implementation of NATO’s missions. It involves strategic plans, resource requirements, material capabilities, operational procedures, command structures, the number of soldiers and logistical infrastructure (Hodges et al. 2019). The dynamics of events after 2014 as well as the emergence of new international threats (e.g. ISIS, refugees, epidemics) has led to increasing expenditures on security and collective defence (Grygiel and Wess Mitchell 2014). This issue seems to be extremely important and therefore still remains within the realm of discussions among the politicians and bodies responsible for the state security. With time and transformations in geopolitical and military situations in the world, the requirements for the North Atlantic Pact have also changed, which has inspired the authors to write this article.

### Russia/China War

#### NATO cohesion k2 check Russia/China war

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A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow. If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats. Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole. If we are to succeed in tackling these shared threats, greater transatlantic cooperation is needed. It cannot remain stagnant, however; it must evolve and expand. The serious nature of the threats, their potential to become kinetic, and the possibility of adversarial coordination (whether formal or informal) means that we must expand our tools to meet these challenges. In the case of Ukraine, on whose border the Kremlin mobilized over 100,000 troops this past summer, the Alliance should consider extending a Membership Action Plan despite the skepticism of some allies. Ukraine must also be empowered in a similar fashion to frontline NATO states like the Baltic states and Poland. After all, the eFP mission in Latvia not only provides military deterrence, but strengthens interlinkages, develops societal resilience, and provides clear and sustained solidarity. Finally, the growing threats of foreign interference, information warfare, cyber attacks and emerging threats to Canada’s Arctic requires a coherent long-term strategy and an evolved notion of collective defence, which includes strengthening our partnerships with non-NATO allies in Europe, Asia, and around the world. Until we impose consequences that force Moscow and Beijing to strategically reconsider their ongoing efforts to probe the extreme boundaries of our threat tolerance, they will continue to test our capacity and political will to confront their aggression. This requires a common understanding and acknowledgement of the threats. It took Russian aggression in 2007 in Estonia, 2008 in Georgia, and the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to achieve a basic common understanding of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s government. Since then, NATO’s eFP missions have thus far deterred Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist ambitions in the Baltic Sea region. We must work towards achieving a similar consensus on the threats posed by Russia and China’s use of information and influence operations, as well as economic, cyber and political warfare against the community of democracies and the developing world at large in order to develop resilience and a common defence against them.

### US Hegemony

#### NATO cohesion is key to free up US resources to maintain global hegemony and counter a rising China

Ben Hodges’ 18 ( Frederick Benjamin "Ben" Hodges III is a retired United States Army officer who served as commanding general, United States Army Europe. He is currently the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat: Marcus Kolga for Inside Policy”, October 5. 2018, MLI, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. The United States is committed to the stability and security of Europe, as it has been for over 100 years ever since the first U.S. soldiers arrived in France during World War I. This has been demonstrated regardless of who has been in the White House and which party-controlled Congress. The American people have a special affinity for Europe, and the economic prosperity of the United States depends on the continent’s security and stability. But they also expect that their European friends and allies will pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order around the globe and ensure that Europe remains whole, free, and at peace.

#### NATO is key to US power projection- provides needed capabilities to counter Russia

Admiral Stavridis’ 18 (Admiral Stavridis (Ret.), a TIME Contributing Editor, was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander at NATO and is Vice Chair, Global Affairs at The Carlyle Group and Chair of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander”, Time, https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/

To many who lived through the Cold War, the alliance may seem like an obvious good deal. By binding Europe’s democracies together, NATO decreased the chances of the brutal conflicts that dominated the continent through the end of World War II. NATO provided a strong counterweight to Russia, and communism more broadly, helping defeat that ideology virtually without firing a shot. And when the U.S. went to war in Afghanistan after 9/11, the NATO allies went with us in their first and only exercise of Article 5. But the Cold War is long over, and new challenges require clear thinking, not nostalgia. Originally conceived, as its first leader, Lord “Pug” Ismay, quipped, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down,” what exactly does NATO exist to do now? Its expansion to the tiny countries named above raises legitimate questions of common purpose and shared values. Russia is back and playing a much subtler role in undermining and threatening the organization. China’s emergence as America’s most powerful global competitor makes NATO seem anachronistic. Is the alliance, as President Donald Trump called it, “obsolete”? It was the avowed NATO hater Vladimir Putin, ironically, who revitalized the alliance and launched NATO 3.0. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 gave new purpose to NATO. I vividly remember attending an alliance meeting shortly after I took command in 2009 during which Chiefs of Defense of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania laid out a passionate, intelligence-based briefing on the possibility of Russian intervention in the Baltic countries. I assessed it to be a very low probability at that moment, but in the years afterward, I became increasingly concerned. We updated our NATO defensive war plans, conducted significant training exercises and requested additional forces across the organization to maintain a higher level of readiness. Putin’s subsequent actions, including the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines jet over Ukraine and increased aggression in the air and on the high seas around NATO’s periphery, drew the alliance together. But even as NATO reawakened, the challenge from outside was changing. Putin has practiced “hybrid warfare” against his neighbors, the would-be NATO members Georgia and Ukraine. A lethal mixture of propaganda, social-network manipulation, cyberoperations, special forces and unconventional terrorist-like attacks poses a different kind of threat than the tanks and missiles of the Cold War. Could Russia make a similar set of moves on a NATO ally? It is smart. U.S. and European defense innovation and production provides a formidable military research and development capacity. Particularly in cybersecurity, unmanned vehicles, space operations, special-forces technologies, maritime and anti-submarine capability, and air and missile defense, NATO is a technology and education superpower. It is capable. The alliance boasts a large command structure of highly qualified teams of military officers from all of the 29 nations. Throughout Europe and the East Coast of the U.S., those teams prepare war plans, conduct training exercises, monitor readiness of allied units, gather intelligence about potential adversaries and run complex operations centers that cover the entire geographic range of NATO. These standing staffs, which we rationalized by reducing them 35% while I was NATO commander, can conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in a coalition structure on short notice. Should we be prepared to fight and die in a NATO campaign? Yes. On balance, the alliance still provides strategic benefit to the U.S. We should support this venerable organization, encourage our allies to increase their defense spending and push them to operate with us on key challenges. We should demand that they help us build a NATO 4.0 that is even more fit for the decades ahead.

### Hegemony Good Impact

#### Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.¶ The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.¶ Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.¶ Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?¶ Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38¶ These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.¶ The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

#### Military primacy solves economic growth, prolif, and great-power war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 5: The Contemporary Amnesia; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

As William Wohlforth has noted, American primacy and activism acted as a powerful deterrent to great-power conflict by creating enormous disincentives for Russia, China, or other actors to incur the “focused enmity” of the United States.11 The persistence and even extension of the U.S. security blanket smothered potential instability in unsettled regions such as Eastern Europe, while removing any possibility of German or Japanese revanchism—a prospect much feared in the early 1990s—by keeping those countries tightly lashed to Washington. American intervention helped extinguish bloody conflicts in the Balkans before they could spread to neighboring countries; U.S. diplomatic and military pressure kept aggressive tyrannies such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea bottled up and helped slow the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. support helped democratic forces triumph in countries from Haiti to Poland, as the number of democracies rose from 76 in 1990 to 120 in 2000;

### At: NATO Deterrence Fails-Underfunding

#### NATO deterrence solves- no signs of underfunding

Gerta Zaimi June 30, 2022 [Researcher on International Relations Middle East and Balkans CSSII- Centro Interdipartimentale di Studi Strategici, Internazionali e Imprenditoriali, Università di Firenze, Italy; Deterrence is back; Robert Lansing institute;]

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted more than ever the importance of NATO’s existence and has undoubtedly forced Western leaders, especially European ones, to deal with their relations with Moscow and the question of the common defense. The conclusions of Thursday’s NATO summit, in the same week that the leaders of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations held their meeting in Germany, mark a clear turning point: the post-Cold War era is over and Russia is no more the strategic partner of the Alliance. Deterrence takes center stage at this summit. The first signs were already born after the invasion of Crimea from Russia, but the decisions of the summit reinforce it more. Four are the most important announcements: the goal of increasing the number of NATO forces on alert, the first permanent American base on the eastern flank of the Alliance, the formal invitation to Finland and Sweden to join NATO and a new guiding strategy of ten years that abandoned the idea of collaboration with Moscow. NATO is committed to increasing the number of rapidly deployable troops to ensure rapid defense for each of the potentially threatened countries. A planned increase to 300,000 soldiers trained and prepared to respond to an attack within 30 days, whose military commanders would have detailed plans to defend against attacks on specific territories with specific troops and weapons. The United States said it would send another 5,000 troops to Romania and the UK and another 1,000 to Estonia. By doing so, the US would not violate the 1997 agreement between NATO and Russia not to permanently station new combat forces on the territory of the former communist bloc countries. For this reason, the US and allied deployments in Romania and the Baltic States will be in rotation and not permanent. A new US Army Corps headquarters permanently stationed in Poland will support the effort once NATO has gathered enough troops from its allies. The Polish base is important because it will provide permanent planning, training and command capabilities for the 300,000 high-alert forces. The United States is deploying two extra destroyers at their naval base in Rota, southern Spain, to strengthen their presence in the Mediterranean, and two F-35 fighter squadrons in the United Kingdom, where they will be designated for patrolling northern Europe for defense and deterrence purpose. The announcement of the increase in US forces could lead to the highest number of American presence since the post-Cold war, reaching 120,000 soldiers. The peak during the Cold War was around 300,000 soldiers.

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## N/U

### N/U- Tech Focus Now

#### Non unique- NATO is already expanding its strategy to focus on emerging technology

Jon Harper 6/29/22

Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, NATO unveils new Strategic Concept, pledges support for new ‘defense innovation accelerator’; FedScoop; https://www.fedscoop.com/nato-unveils-strategic-concept-pledges-support-for-new-defense-innovation-accelerator/

NATO released its new Strategic Concept on Wednesday, and leaders are expected to offer pledges to establish a new “Defense Innovation Accelerator” for the North Atlantic.¶ The need for more focus and investment in emerging technology is a major theme of this week’s NATO Summit in Madrid, which President Biden is attending along with his European counterparts.¶ The innovation accelerator “will support NATO’s efforts to boost interoperability and ensure that every Ally has access to cutting-edge technological solutions for military needs,” according to a White House fact sheet released Wednesday.¶ The United States will contribute to the initiative by facilitating access to U.S. test centers and other technology “accelerator sites” in the “extensive and diverse U.S. innovation sector,” it said.¶ The military alliance is also launching a new innovation fund that will invest 1 billion Euros in startups and other organizations developing “dual-use” emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday during a press conference.¶ Together with the new innovation accelerator, the fund will help the alliance “harness the best new technology for transatlantic security,” he said.¶ NATO’s new Strategic Concept, released Wednesday, states: “Emerging and disruptive technologies bring both opportunities and risks. They are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance and becoming key arenas of global competition. Technological primacy increasingly influences success on the battlefield.”

### N/U- Cyber Focus

#### NATO already expanding its strategic doctrine to center cyber defense- it’s a key part of their deterrence strategy

Jon Harper 6/29/22

Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, NATO unveils new Strategic Concept, pledges support for new ‘defense innovation accelerator’; FedScoop; https://www.fedscoop.com/nato-unveils-strategic-concept-pledges-support-for-new-defense-innovation-accelerator/

Plans also call for enhancing cybersecurity.¶ “Building on last year’s adoption of a new Cyber Defense Policy for NATO, Allied leaders will endorse a new action plan to strengthen cyber cooperation across the political, military, and technical levels,” the White House said. “As an operational domain for NATO, cyber will also be a key component of NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture. Building on lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, Allies will decide at the Summit to use NATO as a coordination platform for offering national assets to build and exercise a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond to a serious cyber-attack. The United States will offer robust national capabilities as part of this support network.”¶ Cyberspace is now “contested at all times,” the Strategic Concept stated.¶ “Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities,” it said. The alliance intends to expedite its “digital transformation,” adapt the NATO Command Structure for the “information age” and enhance its cyber defenses, networks and infrastructure.¶ “We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights,” the document said.¶ The new Strategic Concept — the first update in more than a decade — also focuses on space as a key technology area and warfighting domain.¶ “We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools,” it said, noting that “a single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty” and trigger collective defense responses that could include armed conflict.¶ The alliance also intends to boost the resilience of its space and cyber capabilities which are at risk of being attacked.

#### NATO already has EDT at the center of its strategic doctrine for the next 15 years

JOHN CURRAN 7/1/22

NATO Sets $1 Billion Defense Tech Fund, Cites AI, Space Tech Needs; MeriTalk; https://www.meritalk.com/articles/nato-sets-1-billion-defense-tech-fund-cites-ai-space-tech-needs/

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is launching a new one billion euro (U.S. $1.04 billion) defense technologies investment fund that is likely to cover tech including artificial intelligence, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg said on June 30 at a press conference in Madrid.¶ ¶ The investment fund is separate from the new Defense Innovation Accelerator unveiled earlier this week. NATO announced plans for the innovation accelerator on June 29 as part of a new “strategic concept” that names Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to NATO allies’ security and stability and wraps cybersecurity initiatives more tightly into the alliance’s strategy.¶ ¶ The NATO Innovation Fund “is unique,” Stoltenberg said on June 30. “It is the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund ever.”¶ ¶ He said the fund will invest its money in “early-stage start-ups, and other deep-tech funds across 22 participating nations.” The fund is geared to operate over a 15-year period.¶ ¶ The goal of the effort, he said, will be “harnessing the best of new technology for transatlantic security,” and “maintaining our technological edge [that] has helped to keep our Alliance strong and our nations safe for more than seventy years.”¶ ¶ “Today, nations that do not share our values, like Russia and China, are challenging that lead in everything from Artificial Intelligence to space technologies,” Stoltenberg said. “It is essential that we do everything in our power to remain at the forefront of innovation and technology.”¶ ¶ “This Fund, alongside DIANA, NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, will help to do just that,” he said. “The NATO Innovation Fund will help bring to life those nascent technologies that have the power to transform our security in the decades to come.”

### N/U- Greece/Turkey Disputes

#### Nonunique- NATO currently divided over Turkey conflict

#### Daily Sabah ’22 (Staff written, “NATO urges Turkey, Greece to resolve disagreements over Aegean,” Daily Sabah, 2022.06.15, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/nato-urges-turkey-greece-to-resolve-disagreements-over-aegean)-> HL

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg on Tuesday urged Turkey and Greece to resolve their disagreements over the Aegean Sea, where the two are at loggerheads over islands and airspace. "Diverse views and debate are an essential part of our democracies," the head of the trans-Atlantic military alliance told Greek news agency ANA. But, he said, "we urge Greece and Turkey to solve their differences in the Aegean in a spirit of trust and Allied solidarity." "That means restraint and moderation, and refraining from any actions or rhetoric that could escalate the situation." Stoltenberg's comments came two weeks after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Turkey would no longer participate in regular high-level meetings with Greek leaders intended to foster cooperation between the two countries. Erdoğan raised the stakes last week, warning Greece to demilitarize its Aegean islands and saying he was “not joking.” He spoke during Turkish wargames near the Greek islands that included an amphibious landing scenario. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis responded that he would not engage in a "ping-pong" of personal insults with Erdoğan. The two NATO allies have long been at odds over a number of issues including offshore rights, ownership of uninhabited islets, competing claims over jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping claims over their continental shelves, maritime boundaries, airspace, energy, the ethnically split island of Cyprus, the status of the islands in the Aegean Sea and migrants. They have come close to war three times in the past half-century, while NATO stepped in when a dispute over drilling rights for potential oil and gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea led to a tense naval standoff in the summer of 2020. Turkey says Greece is stationing troops on islands in the Aegean in violation of peace treaties signed after the World Wars, demanding that Greece demilitarize its eastern islands, citing the 20th-century treaties that ceded sovereignty of the islands to Greece. Greece counters that the islands need defenses given threats of war from Turkey, which has NATO's second-biggest military and maintains a large landing fleet on its Aegean coast. Turkey in recent months has stepped up criticism of Greece stationing troops on islands in the eastern Aegean, near the Turkish coast and in many cases visible from shore. These islands were required to be demilitarized under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Treaty of Paris, so any troops or weapons on the islands are strictly forbidden. Starting with the Treaty of London in 1913, the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands was restricted and their demilitarized status was confirmed with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Lausanne pact established a political balance between the two countries by harmonizing vital interests, including those in the Aegean. The 1947 Treaty of Paris, which ceded the Dodecanese islands from Italy to Greece, also confirmed their demilitarized status. However, Greece argues that the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits should be applied in this case, while Ankara says Greece’s obligation to disarm the islands remains unchanged under the Montreux Convention, highlighting that there is no provision that differentiates it from the Treaty of Lausanne on the issue.

### Deterrence Low Now

#### NATO is divided now and deterrence is low- only cooperation can solve

Mcnamara 22 [Thomas E. McNamara is a United States diplomat and State Department official. “Putin's Challenge to NATO and to the Global Enterprise'”. 5-1-2022. ProQuest. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2658311974/fulltext/6E0C463534C946DDPQ/1?accountid=3672. Accessed 7-1-2022; MJen]

The West, however, must deal with Putin as he is. He has legitimate complaints about short-sighted Western policies. For years the U.S. has devalued diplomacy out of ignorance and hubris, which undermines national security and NATO. NATO and EU expansions were good ideas, but were uncoordinated, and poorly developed and executed. Abandoning most arms control, which benefited American-Russian mutual security, was a major mistake, leaving our European allies to face Putin's missile threats. None of those, however, justifies Putin's war in Ukraine. Putin's unilateral, military threats fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War order, not just in Ukraine. The West's biggest mistake, however, was failure to maintain a credible NATO deterrent posture in Europe. European nations allowed their military capabilities to deteriorate; some became impotent. The Alliance was blind and unresponsive to leadership and policy changes in Moscow over two decades. Putin is not Gorbachev or Yeltsin; yet NATO acted as though he were. NATO ignored U.S. urgings to strengthen itself, and the warnings of its East Central European members even after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and take-over of part of the Donbas. These errors make NATO partly responsible for the invasion of Ukraine - a sin of omission. The immediate reaction of NATO to the invasion is a plus, provided it is a first step of a new era in European security thinking and NATO policies.

## Links

### At: AI/Cyber Link

#### No link- NATO is unified in its integration of cyber and AI into the alliance mission

Nick Fouriezos 6/29/22

Atlanta-based writer with bylines from every US state and six continents; Blinken: NATO is ‘more united, more focused’ after historic summit; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/blinken-nato-is-more-united-more-focused-after-historic-summit/

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken pushed for world leaders to continue sustained action—in supporting Ukraine, in pressuring Russia, and in reinforcing NATO on the heels of its historic decision to invite Finland and Sweden to join the defensive alliance. ¶ “NATO is emerging from this summit more united, more focused, and with more assets to deal with a multiplicity of challenges,” Blinken said, praising the solidarity shown in this week’s gathering in Madrid. ¶ The conversations at the two-day NATO Public Forum, taking place on the sidelines of the Madrid summit, brought together a number of global leaders in person and virtually, including US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who reaffirmed US support for Article 5, the principle of collective defense, as “ironclad.” ¶ “This alarming challenge to national sovereignty must be met by a unified global commitment to peace and security,” Pelosi said of Russian aggression, while also calling for action to defend against China through continued “cooperation with our Asia-Pacific partners to bolster cybersecurity, counter disinformation, and preserve our collective defense.” ¶ This week, NATO nations agreed on a new Strategic Concept that declares the Alliance’s priorities in staving off military and economic threats from Russia and China, reasserting shared democratic values and human-rights protections, and battling new threats from the realms of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence.¶ “All of these things are challenges we have to meet and face,” Blinken said, “but we know that we’re going to be more effective in doing it if we actually have a shared, common approach.”

### At: Cyber Link

#### Cooperation on cybersecurity is key to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense mission

Franklin D. Kramer, Lauren Speranza, and Conor Rodihan et al in 2020

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a board director of the Atlantic Council;¶ Lauren M. Speranza is director of Transatlantic Defense and Security at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA);¶ Conor Rodihan is an assistant director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative; NATO needs continuous responses in cyberspace; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-continuous-responses-in-cyberspace/

President-Elect Joe Biden’s transition team has declared cyber threats as “one of the defining challenges of our time.” In its early days, the incoming US administration must take on cybersecurity threats as one of its key priorities. Nowhere will that effort be more important than with the United States’ closest Allies at NATO, a cornerstone for Western security. Today, NATO’s security is threatened by Russia’s and China’s continuous cyberattacks on the Alliance and its members. To accomplish its mission of deterrence and defense, NATO needs to implement a strategy of proactive, continuous responses to China and Russia in cyberspace, where great power competition is playing out in real time.¶ Russia and China challenge NATO and its members in cyberspace on a daily basis, as part of ongoing hybrid campaigns to undermine the transatlantic community. The Kremlin’s actions have involved intrusions into Allies’ critical infrastructures, manipulating Allies’ elections through hacks and disinformation, and even blocking GPS information critical to NATO activities. The Chinese government has engaged in cyber espionage against Allies’ military capabilities; intellectual property theft related to sensitive technologies, industries, and infrastructure; and disinformation against transatlantic countries, including around the coronavirus. These efforts to weaken NATO countries and Alliance cohesion represent a persistent threat to Allied security.¶ NATO has recognized the collective dangers of these hybrid attacks in cyberspace. Up to this point, however, the Alliance has taken a reactive approach, responding as if Russian and Chinese cyber attacks are each isolated incidents. But because Russian and Chinese cyber efforts are part of continuous campaigns directed at the overall capability of the Alliance, NATO’s response has been insufficient, failing to reduce or dissuade further attacks. To assure the security of its members going forward, NATO needs its own continuous response campaign to these threats.¶ President-elect Biden and his team have pledged to renew US leadership in cooperation with Allies and partners. That agenda should start at NATO, and a key focus should be on cybersecurity. In early NATO meetings, the Biden administration should champion a cybersecurity continuous-response campaign, built around three key actions.

### At: EDT Link

#### Integrating EDT’s into NATO’s strategic doctrine is key to maintain the alliance’s effective deterrence

JORDAN BECKER, DOUGLAS LUTE, AND SIMON SMITH et al 6/28/22

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DON’T LET RUSSIA DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/

When NATO members agree on a new Strategic Concept at their summit in Madrid, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will dominate the discussion. But with this existential crisis rightfully taking center stage, other threats have not gone away. The challenge for NATO is to situate Russia’s invasion in a wider strategic context, addressing other key issues before they create new existential crises in the future.¶ What does this mean in practice? We contend that despite the current centrality of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Sino-American rivalry is likely to drive U.S. national security thinking in the coming decades. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept should address this reality. Among the many challenges in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific, China’s designs on Taiwan figure most prominently. China is watching the Russo-Ukrainian war closely, seeking to draw strategic lessons. This dynamic need not be catastrophic for European and trans-Atlantic security. It creates opportunities for E.U.-NATO cooperation and greater European strategic autonomy (or strategic responsibility) in the context of an enduring trans-Atlantic bond. Europe and Asia are increasingly linked as two theaters in a global system hinging on the United States and anchored in its alliances in both regions. The strategic concept should thus lay out a vision for how NATO can simultaneously compete with both China and Russia.¶ There are also several specific threats and challenges that the 2022 Strategic Concept should address. First, allies should tackle the effects of emerging and emerged disruptive technologies on strategic, defense, and force planning. Second, adversaries are increasingly using high- and low-tech approaches short of armed conflict to disrupt national politics and daily life in Western democracies. Enhancing and coordinating resilience across the alliance should be a goal of the strategic concept. Third, money remains the sinew of war. Whether it is investment in national and common-funded capabilities, or transfers to partners like Ukraine, ample and efficient spending is a requirement for a successful strategy. Fourth, NATO should continue to grapple with the distinct but related challenges of terrorism and irregular warfare.

#### Cooperation on EDTs is key to deterrence- shows resolve and willingness to defend the alliance

JORDAN BECKER, DOUGLAS LUTE, AND SIMON SMITH et al 6/28/22

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DON’T LET RUSSIA DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/

A significant strategic concern for NATO allies is to avoid precipitating a Russian-Chinese authoritarian alignment. While Russia and China face distinct strategic challenges of their own and their “unlimited partnership” has appeared to stumble upon some limits, their continued pursuit of emerging, disruptive technologies and their authoritarian models of governance present significant risks to NATO allies. These models, coupled with Russia and China’s shared willingness to undermine national and international institutions in the trans-Atlantic community, mean that the most daunting threat NATO faces may be to its foundational values. Incorporating these core values into strategy and policy will be a key task for the 2022 Strategic Concept.¶ New Domains¶ Whether in coordination or not, China and Russia will undoubtedly continue to challenge allies in domains like space and cyber using emerging and emerged technologies. Dealing with such challenges is core NATO business — grounded in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and resting primarily with national authorities. The new Strategic Concept should aim to integrate these relatively new domains while responding to disruptive technologies as well. Allies must endeavor to reach a “pre-crisis” consensus on what space and cyber actions would constitute an “armed attack” in accordance with Article 5. This kind of crisis decision-making is a core function of NATO’s political and military headquarters. Such agreement, when paired with improved national capabilities, would contribute to deterrence by communicating resolve to adversaries. Improved capabilities themselves will only arise through public-private partnership to maintain a technological edge. A common strategic culture of innovation, much of which arises from the private sector, is a key advantage that NATO has — and should retain — over its adversaries. Such innovation has been on display in the Russo-Ukrainian war and will doubtless be essential in future conflicts.

#### Incorporations of EDTs raise NATO functionality and strength.

Borchert et. al 21 (Heiko Borchert, John Allen, Marcin Zaborowski; Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs. He is Associate Partner of Wise Pens International, a European consultancy specializing on maritime security policy and advice, and member of the board of the Journal for Foreign and Security Policy; John Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces; Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). In 2001, he received his Ph. D. in International Studies from the University of Birmingham in the UK; “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address”; 12/13/21; https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address)//akg

Emerging technologies are the geo-economics Achilles heel NATO needs to address to deter aggressors, write General John Allen, Heiko Borchert and Marcin Zaborowski. General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC. To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment. To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies. The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element. Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks. The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies. Therefore, the Alliance needs to step up activities with the European Commission, which works on a classification system to identify ESG-compliant activities, to make defence investments compatible. Third, business is the first line of defence in a geoeconomic world, and NATO needs a platform to discuss geoeconomics with business. Today, the NATO Industry Forum is the leading gathering to address defence industrial matters with defence companies. However, the emphasis on emerging technologies underlines the importance of non-defence companies. Therefore, NATO should envisage a new special format of the North Atlantic Council to meet with the NATO Industry Forum members – and possibly also the European Commission – to allow state and corporate leaders to jointly engage on the proposed economic security agenda. Fourth, strategic-level public-private dialogue also breathes new life into deepening cooperation with the private sector. NATO should become an early adopter of the solutions developed with allied money. Making NATO the launch customer sends important market signals and provides companies with an initial track record confirming the relevance of their solutions. In addition, the Alliance should step up efforts to incorporate business into military operations. Logistics companies already play a crucial role, and traditional defence businesses provide frontline support. The next stage comes with closely integrating digital companies to leverage their contribution. But for non-defence companies to provide frontline support, NATO not only needs the right mindset, but the Alliance also needs to think about incentives such as covering personnel risks on overseas deployments. Finally, NATO’s ability to stimulate innovation and ensure economic security also depends on how it does business. Critically, NATO needs to strive for a mission and capabilities-based innovation portfolio that maximises the value of allied money. NATO may take a page from the financial services industry and use a real options approach to manage technological risk and drive technology development. This approach prices technology building blocks like financial options, advances risk mitigation, speeds up technology adoption and gives force planners and developers more leeway to maximise input and output. In addition, NATO should offer strategic hedging solutions for defence critical raw materials by combining corporate demand estimates with AI-based insights on financial and raw material markets. This will facilitate optimal, company-tailored hedging strategies to mitigate the corporate security of supply and price risks. Overall, NATO’s relevance in the 21st century remains tackling defence challenges in a new strategic environment, increasingly defined by emerging and rapidly changing technologies and the profoundly important role of the private sector. To this purpose, NATO has embraced innovation and emerging technologies. This step, however, makes NATO subject to a new geoeconomic dynamic that unfolds around competition for standards, business models, technologies, and supply chains. This requires NATO to make economic security a core element of its new Strategic Concept to ensure NATO’s edge. In turn, this will provide a sound basis for expanded cooperation with the European Union, and make NATO an esteemed partner of the new Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council, the new body set up to enhance the EU-U.S. technology, economic, and trade partnership.

## Impacts

### NATO Deterrence Fails- Underfunded

#### No NATO Deterrence- underfunding

Franklin D. Kramer and Barry Pavel June 13, 2022 [Distinguished Fellow Board Director Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Senior Vice President and Director Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war; Atlantic Council;]

As a starting point, it is important to recognize that almost all NATO nations, other than the United States, have—in the words of a recent European Union (EU) analysis—had “years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military” capabilities.1 Most importantly in the context of the current environment, the “capacity to operate full-spectrum and at high intensity was neglected.”2 That neglect, and the concomitant need to focus on reestablishing the capacity for high-intensity battle, is well recognized by NATO military leaders. For example, France’s “Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff” specifically sets forth the requirement to be able to “respond…in a high-intensity conflict.”3 Yet, as a recent RAND report stated: France’s capacity to sustain a high-end, conventional conflict nonetheless is limited. The French military might be able to accomplish all its assigned missions at once, but it lacks depth, meaning that such demanding operations would quickly exhaust both its human and material resources.” What is true for France is similarly true for other European militaries, including—perhaps most importantly—Germany, which has suffered from years of underspending and strategic neglect. In addition, while operating at a different scale in terms of resources and reach, the US military itself is insufficiently prepared, in particular, in terms of its munitions and supply inventories for a sustained, high-intensity conflict. However, these deficiencies are entirely remediable if appropriate measures are taken. The initial requirement for success in high-intensity conflict is, of course, simply to have sufficient weapons and support available. The EU analysis includes the need to “[r]eplenish stockpiles” among the “most urgent capability gaps.”4 Taking lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, those stockpiles should include anti-armor capabilities and man-portable and medium-range air defenses, each of which adds to the maneuver capability and lethality of ground units. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles for both sensing and attack and long-range fires have proved to be key battlefield weapons, and air defenses for rear areas are also critical. Finally, inventories of precision-guided munitions for air forces need to be substantially increased. All of the foregoing should be undertaken in the context of a potential conflict that, as the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated, can extend for multiple months—and perhaps even years. So, inventories and replenishment capacities need to be established with such a timeframe in mind. NATO should utilize the defense planning process to set the necessary targets. There should be no doubt, however, that achieving the requisite level of capability will require significant defense-budget increases, as the gap has been very substantial. As the EU analysis states: Had all Member States spent 2% of their GDP on defence with 20% dedicated to investment, since 2006 until 2020, this would have resulted in an additional approximately EUR 1,100 billion for defence, of which around EUR 270 billion on investment.” As that analysis makes clear, just meeting NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending goal will not be sufficient to resolve the substantial readiness and sustainment deficiencies in any reasonable timeframe. To be sure, the 2-percent goal is important, but NATO needs to establish an additional readiness/sustainment initiative over a shorter period—perhaps three or four years—that would substantially increase the readiness of national forces. The large increases in Germany’s investment budget provide a model for a budgetary approach that should be undertaken by other countries. Germany has promised to reach 2 percent annually, including by spending one hundred billion euros over a four-year period on investment.5 Other countries should follow the German approach and establish special investment-funding streams focused on readiness and sustainability that would be designed to resolve the shortfalls in a three-to-four-year period. Along with the funding increases, and as an additional part of a NATO readiness/sustainment effort, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) should be given the task (and authority) to review and report on the readiness of the forces that will be called upon in the event of a contingency. A focused effort on readiness and sustainability, generated through the defense-planning process and overseen by the SACEUR, will significantly enhance NATO’s deterrent and defense posture.